feat(ql3): add cluster tool result key authority

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whyour
2026-08-15 00:40:56 +08:00
parent 93690dd921
commit aae96390cc
10 changed files with 829 additions and 91 deletions
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最新增量证据(2026-08-14): 最新增量证据(2026-08-14):
- D-314/ADR-0406(已接受):Cluster Trusted Tool 的 encrypted completion 不再停留在 storage port。`@qinglong/cluster-control/trusted-tool-result-keyring` 新增只读 projected material authoritycanonical v1 manifest 只含最多 16 个 canonical 32-byte key,不含 generation、active/state/retirementprovider 只有 `resolve(keyId)` 而没有 `active()`;因此 PostgreSQL `trusted-tool-results` catalog 仍是 active/decryptable 状态唯一 authoritycompletion 会以 catalog material proof 再次校验。runtime 每次调用重新执行 direct-root、in-root atomic symlink、single-link、64 KiB、只读/不可执行/other-inaccessible mode、dev/inode/size/mtime 与双 realpath fence,不持有 Kubernetes API、cache、watcher 或 timer。新增能力位于 Cluster Control 既有 `trusted-tool/key-management/`,并把 mounted Secret 与 keyring 的 projected-file/TOCTOU 逻辑收敛到 package-private `security/privateProjectedFile` 真源;公开 mounted Secret 行为不变,不新增 package、依赖、migration、连接、route 或默认 Profile importer。定向共享回归 7/7Cluster Control 完整 234 pass/2 条条件 skip/0 fail;最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,207 pass/2 条件 skip/0 failpackage/dependency/Edge import/Cluster deployment 四项审计零 finding。workspace 仍为 18 package、无单文件或浅平 packageCluster Control 54 个源码中仅 2 个 binary entry 位于根层,52 个处于嵌套领域目录。14 档 Local Profile artifact 全部通过,默认 Edge/Standalone 保持 2,589,812/2,589,890 bytesAI 保持 3,121,108/3,121,198 bytesMCP 保持 7,315,930/7,316,038 bytes。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `26c817647ed984d8d4627a7cae1c95de06017a5d6d32dd3dfd01414ba029e542`,证据审计与 Docker 容器/网络/卷零残留。下一 Gate 是独立 diagnosis Run 的 Tool/Model Step admission 与 Copilot encrypted model completion,不能借用终态源 Run 或 Plugin Prompt plan。
- D-313/ADR-0405(已接受):新增 `@qinglong/ai/failure-diagnosis-prompt`,把 ADR-0403 的潜在敏感日志投影收敛为固定 system instruction + canonical JSON data envelope;日志只存在于 `log.content` JSON string value,不能通过引号、换行、伪造 role/schema 或 delimiter 拼接出新 message。builder 重新校验完整 trust/redaction/profile byte 契约,拒绝伪造 `safe`、行动权、未知字段与 byte/signal driftenvelope 不带 Run/Attempt、Artifact、path、cursor 或 content digest。部署者必须通过 `qinglong/copilot-model-egress-policy@v1` 显式允许 `potentially_sensitive` 数据进入 `on_device|external` 边界并提供输入/output token 双预算,空 allowlist 与 external 未授权均在 Model Gateway/Provider I/O 前失败关闭。输出只含 content-free egress evidence,并固定要求模型 completion 继承潜在敏感、仅加密持久化、禁止明文审计且无行动权;真正 Cluster Trusted Tool/model completion 仍需后续组合门。能力以 `ql3-ai/src/copilot/failure-diagnosis/` 三个内聚文件和精确 subpath 交付,不新增 package、依赖、迁移、连接或常驻组件。定向 12/12、AI 221 pass/3 条件 skip/0 fail;最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,207 pass/2 条件 skip/0 fail,四项结构/部署审计零 finding14 档 Local Profile artifact 全部通过。默认 Edge/Standalone 保持 2,589,812/2,589,890 bytes、315 files、56 modulesEdge/Standalone AI 保持 3,121,108/3,121,198 bytes、368 files、61 modulesMCP 保持 7,315,930/7,316,038 bytes、801 files、226 modules,证明未装配 subpath 被完全裁掉。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `2bbc8bdd0d90e6ec9ce82d2afcaec817679dddb82860c5d405a09d5e5458bece`,证据审计与 Docker 零残留。 - D-313/ADR-0405(已接受):新增 `@qinglong/ai/failure-diagnosis-prompt`,把 ADR-0403 的潜在敏感日志投影收敛为固定 system instruction + canonical JSON data envelope;日志只存在于 `log.content` JSON string value,不能通过引号、换行、伪造 role/schema 或 delimiter 拼接出新 message。builder 重新校验完整 trust/redaction/profile byte 契约,拒绝伪造 `safe`、行动权、未知字段与 byte/signal driftenvelope 不带 Run/Attempt、Artifact、path、cursor 或 content digest。部署者必须通过 `qinglong/copilot-model-egress-policy@v1` 显式允许 `potentially_sensitive` 数据进入 `on_device|external` 边界并提供输入/output token 双预算,空 allowlist 与 external 未授权均在 Model Gateway/Provider I/O 前失败关闭。输出只含 content-free egress evidence,并固定要求模型 completion 继承潜在敏感、仅加密持久化、禁止明文审计且无行动权;真正 Cluster Trusted Tool/model completion 仍需后续组合门。能力以 `ql3-ai/src/copilot/failure-diagnosis/` 三个内聚文件和精确 subpath 交付,不新增 package、依赖、迁移、连接或常驻组件。定向 12/12、AI 221 pass/3 条件 skip/0 fail;最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,207 pass/2 条件 skip/0 fail,四项结构/部署审计零 finding14 档 Local Profile artifact 全部通过。默认 Edge/Standalone 保持 2,589,812/2,589,890 bytes、315 files、56 modulesEdge/Standalone AI 保持 3,121,108/3,121,198 bytes、368 files、61 modulesMCP 保持 7,315,930/7,316,038 bytes、801 files、226 modules,证明未装配 subpath 被完全裁掉。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `2bbc8bdd0d90e6ec9ce82d2afcaec817679dddb82860c5d405a09d5e5458bece`,证据审计与 Docker 零残留。
- D-312/ADR-0404(已接受):`qinglong.run.log.excerpt@1.0.0` 进入显式可选的本机 `ql3-mcp` stdio 产品入口。每次调用固定经过 Owner credential authentication、exact `tool.call:qinglong.run.log.excerpt` + `artifact.read` Policy、durable audit、credential/Pepper fence confirm,再复用同一 SQLite authority 和私有 Artifact reader 完成 ADR-0403 的 Edge 4 KiB/Standalone 8 KiB 双读取安全投影。配置升级为 `qinglong/local-mcp-server@v2` 并要求显式 private `artifactRoot`,旧 v1 不猜测路径而是失败关闭。产物实证否决了 MCP 直接依赖 `local-execution` 的方案:该方案会带入 process/scheduler/croner,达到 7,469,105 bytes/816 files/228 modules;唯一 reader 实现因此归入既有 `local-command-file/artifact-read` 私有文件 authorityExecution 通过兼容 re-export 复用,workspace 仍为 18 package 且没有根层平铺。Local MCP 48/48、Local Execution 41/41、私有文件 3/3、依赖防火墙 54/54;最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,207 pass/2 条件 skip/0 fail,四项结构/部署审计零 finding14 个 Local Profile artifact 全部通过。默认 Edge/Standalone 保持 2,589,812/2,589,890 bytes、315 files、56 modulesEdge/Standalone MCP 为 7,315,930/7,316,038 bytes、801 files、226 modules、RSS 38,420,480/39,567,360 bytes,闭包不含 `local-execution``local-process``croner`。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `29cd77d80737a3b1ab686c998d05a78c52deffd8add3b31d8035756d5dfcc433`,证据审计与 Docker 零残留。 - D-312/ADR-0404(已接受):`qinglong.run.log.excerpt@1.0.0` 进入显式可选的本机 `ql3-mcp` stdio 产品入口。每次调用固定经过 Owner credential authentication、exact `tool.call:qinglong.run.log.excerpt` + `artifact.read` Policy、durable audit、credential/Pepper fence confirm,再复用同一 SQLite authority 和私有 Artifact reader 完成 ADR-0403 的 Edge 4 KiB/Standalone 8 KiB 双读取安全投影。配置升级为 `qinglong/local-mcp-server@v2` 并要求显式 private `artifactRoot`,旧 v1 不猜测路径而是失败关闭。产物实证否决了 MCP 直接依赖 `local-execution` 的方案:该方案会带入 process/scheduler/croner,达到 7,469,105 bytes/816 files/228 modules;唯一 reader 实现因此归入既有 `local-command-file/artifact-read` 私有文件 authorityExecution 通过兼容 re-export 复用,workspace 仍为 18 package 且没有根层平铺。Local MCP 48/48、Local Execution 41/41、私有文件 3/3、依赖防火墙 54/54;最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,207 pass/2 条件 skip/0 fail,四项结构/部署审计零 finding14 个 Local Profile artifact 全部通过。默认 Edge/Standalone 保持 2,589,812/2,589,890 bytes、315 files、56 modulesEdge/Standalone MCP 为 7,315,930/7,316,038 bytes、801 files、226 modules、RSS 38,420,480/39,567,360 bytes,闭包不含 `local-execution``local-process``croner`。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `29cd77d80737a3b1ab686c998d05a78c52deffd8add3b31d8035756d5dfcc433`,证据审计与 Docker 零残留。
- D-311/ADR-0403(已接受):新增 `qinglong.run.log.excerpt@1.0.0` 共享 Trusted Tool kernel。输入只接受 Run/Attempt IDProject 来自受信 context;禁止 Artifact ID、路径、URI、offset、length 与 cursor。Tool 复用 ADR-0377 的 Local 私有文件和 Cluster S3 日志 range reader,以一次 1-byte 尾部探测和一次 profile 固定窗口读取完成有界选择,不循环、不分页:Edge 4 KiB、Standalone 8 KiB、Cluster Control 16 KiBWorker 拒绝;日志并发增长通过 `tailComplete=false``bounded_tail_probe_then_range_read` 明示,不冒充事务快照。内容执行非致命 UTF-8、控制/bidi 归一与七类已识别 credential 确定性掩码,始终声明 `residualSensitivity=potentially_sensitive`,并无条件作为 `data_only_never_execute``actionAuthority=none` 的不可信执行输出;Prompt 注入信号只作提示,不能授予 Tool/命令权限。能力位于 Runtime Core 既有二级目录,只导出精确 subpath,不新增 package、依赖、migration、连接或常驻组件;MCP/HTTP/Cluster 产品入口与最终 Prompt builder 留给独立门禁。最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,206 pass/2 条件 skip/0 failpackage/dependency/Edge import/Cluster deployment 审计零 finding14 个 Local Profile 制品门全部通过;默认 Edge 保持 2,589,812 bytes/315 files/56 modulesEdge AI 为 3,121,108 bytes/368 files/61 modulesEdge MCP 为 7,237,187 bytes/795 files/220 modules,均在门内。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125 Gate、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `1a0df2518d39db22ecf4bbaf2e06c9e6893e1bbf507b4026b2e0ef055eb2fd90` - D-311/ADR-0403(已接受):新增 `qinglong.run.log.excerpt@1.0.0` 共享 Trusted Tool kernel。输入只接受 Run/Attempt IDProject 来自受信 context;禁止 Artifact ID、路径、URI、offset、length 与 cursor。Tool 复用 ADR-0377 的 Local 私有文件和 Cluster S3 日志 range reader,以一次 1-byte 尾部探测和一次 profile 固定窗口读取完成有界选择,不循环、不分页:Edge 4 KiB、Standalone 8 KiB、Cluster Control 16 KiBWorker 拒绝;日志并发增长通过 `tailComplete=false``bounded_tail_probe_then_range_read` 明示,不冒充事务快照。内容执行非致命 UTF-8、控制/bidi 归一与七类已识别 credential 确定性掩码,始终声明 `residualSensitivity=potentially_sensitive`,并无条件作为 `data_only_never_execute``actionAuthority=none` 的不可信执行输出;Prompt 注入信号只作提示,不能授予 Tool/命令权限。能力位于 Runtime Core 既有二级目录,只导出精确 subpath,不新增 package、依赖、migration、连接或常驻组件;MCP/HTTP/Cluster 产品入口与最终 Prompt builder 留给独立门禁。最终 18-package clean build/test 与 backend 1,206 pass/2 条件 skip/0 failpackage/dependency/Edge import/Cluster deployment 审计零 finding14 个 Local Profile 制品门全部通过;默认 Edge 保持 2,589,812 bytes/315 files/56 modulesEdge AI 为 3,121,108 bytes/368 files/61 modulesEdge MCP 为 7,237,187 bytes/795 files/220 modules,均在门内。PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 125/125 Gate、timeline `1→2`,报告 SHA-256 为 `1a0df2518d39db22ecf4bbaf2e06c9e6893e1bbf507b4026b2e0ef055eb2fd90`
@@ -6930,6 +6931,12 @@ envelope 将日志限制在不可混淆的 string value;部署者必须显式
关闭。该 kernel 只生成 `GenerateRequest` 和 content-free egress evidence,同时声明 completion 必须 关闭。该 kernel 只生成 `GenerateRequest` 和 content-free egress evidence,同时声明 completion 必须
加密、禁止明文审计且无行动权;Cluster Trusted Tool invocation、产品级 result key、模型调用与 加密、禁止明文审计且无行动权;Cluster Trusted Tool invocation、产品级 result key、模型调用与
encrypted completion 的真实组合仍是下一独立 Gate。 encrypted completion 的真实组合仍是下一独立 Gate。
ADR-0406 已关闭其中的 Cluster result-key material 缺口:只读 projected keyring 不携带 active
选择权,PostgreSQL catalog 继续独占 generation/state authority;它与 Prompt output keyring 分域,
并复用 Cluster Control 内部唯一 projected-file 安全读取原语。该 adapter 尚未开放 route,也不代表
Copilot execution authority 已完成;下一 Gate 必须创建独立 diagnosis Run 的 Tool/Model Step admission
再把 S3 Tool completion、ADR-0405 builder、Model Gateway 与 Copilot 专用 encrypted model completion
串成可恢复闭环。
## 17. Tool Registry ## 17. Tool Registry
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# ADR-0406Cluster Projected Tool Result Key Authority
- 状态:Accepted
- 日期:2026-08-14
- 关联 RFCQL-RFC-0001 D-314、Phase 2
- 关联 ADRADR-0163、ADR-0164、ADR-0166、ADR-0263、ADR-0403、ADR-0405
## 问题
ADR-0163~0166 已完成 Trusted Tool 成功结果的加密 Artifact、PostgreSQL catalog fence、rotation/
rekey/retirement 协议和双方言 repositoryCluster runtime 也已经从同一 Pool 装配 completion、catalog
与 rekey storage。但产品组合只有 storage port,没有可部署的 result-key material provider,因此
ADR-0405 的日志 Tool 还不能在 Cluster 中兑现 encrypted completion。
直接复用 Plugin Package Prompt output keyring 会混合两种密文域和轮换 ceremony;让投影文件携带
`activeKeyId` 又会与 PostgreSQL `trusted-tool-results` catalog 形成双 active authority。把 key 写入环境
变量、数据库或常驻缓存,则分别失去文件权限/轮换证明、违反数据库不保存 material 的约束,或引入撤权
窗口。该能力也不足以形成新的部署制品或 workspace package。
## 决策
1. 在既有 `@qinglong/cluster-control``src/trusted-tool/key-management/` 中增加 Cluster Tool Result
projected keyring,并只通过精确 subpath `trusted-tool-result-keyring` 导出。它不进入 package root、
默认 control composition、Edge/Standalone 或普通 Worker closure。
2. manifest 固定为 `qinglong/cluster-tool-result-projected-keyring@v1`,只含 canonical `keys` mapkey ID
沿用 Runtime Core catalog 约束,material 必须是 canonical base64url 的 32 bytes。投影最多包含 16 个
key,与 catalog 的最大 decryptable key 数一致;文件最大 64 KiB 且必须是单行 canonical JSON 加换行。
3. manifest **没有** generation、active key、state、retirement 或恢复字段。provider 只实现 `resolve(keyId)`
不实现 `active()`;当前加密 key 与历史可解密状态只能由 PostgreSQL catalog 的 generation/digest/
material proof fence 决定。投影文件增删 key 不能自行改变 durable catalog 状态。
4. `verify()` 只返回 key ID、Runtime Core domain-separated material proof 和整个投影的 content-free digest
不返回 encoded/raw material。Trusted Tool completion 仍会在每次使用时以 catalog entry 的 proof
重新校验 material,调用完成后由既有 coordinator 清零 owned key bytes。
5. runtime 每次 resolve 都重新打开投影,不使用 Kubernetes API、ServiceAccount、list/watch、cache、timer
或后台进程。允许 Kubernetes atomic-writer symlink,但 resolved regular file 必须留在 direct、非 symlink
root 下;同时校验 single-link、大小、只读/不可执行/other-inaccessible mode、dev/inode/size/mtime 和
root/target 二次 realpath,轮换竞争失败关闭。
6. Cluster Control 内原有 mounted Secret provider 与新 keyring 共享 package-private
`security/privateProjectedFile` primitive。原公开类、错误码、文件名、大小和权限语义不变;抽取消除两套
TOCTOU/symlink 实现,后续安全修正只有一个真源。该 primitive 不新增公开 export。
7. 本阶段不增加环境变量、volume、route 或 AI 启动前置条件。只有后续 Cluster Copilot composition 明确
启用并把该 provider 与 PostgreSQL catalog、Trusted Tool coordinator 连接时,部署者才需要投影它;
adapter 存在不等于执行 authority 已开放。
## 低配与集群影响
- 默认 Edge/Standalone 和默认 Cluster Control 没有新 importer、listener、连接、timer、watcher、cache、
migration、表或常驻内存;workspace 继续保持 18 个 package。
- Cluster AI 后续只在一次 Tool completion 时读取最多 64 KiB 的一个 manifest,内存 key 数硬限 16
PostgreSQL 继续是 active/decryptable state 的唯一事实源。
- 实现使用既有 package 的嵌套领域目录,不创建单文件 package,也不把文件平铺到 `src/` 根。
## 被否决方案
1. **复用 Prompt output keyring/root**:跨加密域复用 material 与 rotation ceremony,扩大单 key 泄露半径。
2. **manifest 自带 activeKeyId**:会让文件和 PostgreSQL catalog 同时选择 active generation。
3. **把 raw/wrapped key 放进 PostgreSQL**:违反 ADR-0166 的 catalog/material 分离与数据库最小泄露面。
4. **使用环境变量或进程缓存**:缺少轮换文件身份,且产生撤权窗口和长期明文驻留。
5. **为 provider 新建 workspace package**:没有独立进程、制品、权限角色或第二个生产 consumer。
6. **复制 mounted Secret 的安全读取代码**:会让 symlink、mode 与 TOCTOU 修复发生行为漂移。
## 当前验证
1. 新增 3 项 keyring 测试,覆盖无 `active()` authority、material proof、owned bytes、原子投影轮换、
historical/missing key、非 canonical JSON、错误 key 长度、可写文件、逃逸 symlink、symlink root 和路径逃逸。
2. 共享 projected-file 抽取与既有 mounted Secret 回归合计 7/7Cluster Control 完整测试为
234 pass、2 条 PostgreSQL/S3 条件 skip、0 fail。
3. `pnpm run test:packages:ql3` 完成 18-package clean build/test;完整 backend 为 1,207 pass、2 条
条件 skip、0 fail。package boundary、Cluster dependency、Edge import 与 Cluster deployment 四项审计
均为 compatible 且零 finding。
4. workspace 仍为 18 个 package,无单文件或浅平 packageCluster Control 共 54 个源码文件,只有
`aiCli.ts``cli.ts` 两个 binary entry 位于 `src/` 根,其余 52 个均处于嵌套领域目录。
5. 14 档 Local Profile artifact 全部通过;默认 Edge/Standalone 为 2,589,812/2,589,890 bytes
AI 为 3,121,108/3,121,198 bytesMCP 为 7,315,930/7,316,038 bytes。证明新增 Cluster-only
subpath 没有进入低配设备的本地闭包。
6. PostgreSQL 18.4 arm64 HA 为 125/125 Gate、timeline `1→2`;报告 SHA-256 为
`26c817647ed984d8d4627a7cae1c95de06017a5d6d32dd3dfd01414ba029e542`,独立证据审计零 finding
Docker 容器、网络与卷零残留。
## 后续门禁
1. 定义独立 Copilot diagnosis Run admission,在同一诊断 Run 中创建 Tool Step 与 Model Step;不能把 Tool
Step 追加到已终态的源失败 Run,也不能借用 Plugin Package Prompt plan 冒充 Copilot plan。
2. 组合 Project Tool snapshot、invocation Artifact key、S3 log reader、result-key provider 和统一 Trusted
Tool completion,证明 response-loss replay 不会重复执行 adapter。
3. 将 ADR-0405 builder 与现有 Model Gateway 连接,并建立 Copilot 专用 encrypted model completion
禁止把 live response、普通 model completion 或 Prompt output Artifact 冒充潜在敏感诊断完成记录。
4. 最后才开放默认关闭的认证/Policy/audit/credential-fenced Cluster route,并补多副本 HA、真实 S3、
外部 Provider fault injection 与 plaintext audit negative evidence。
+2
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@@ -408,6 +408,8 @@
| [ADR-0402](./ADR-0402-bounded-latest-task-run-outcome-comparison.md) | 有界的 Task 最近成功/失败 Run 对比 | Accepted | | [ADR-0402](./ADR-0402-bounded-latest-task-run-outcome-comparison.md) | 有界的 Task 最近成功/失败 Run 对比 | Accepted |
| [ADR-0403](./ADR-0403-bounded-redacted-run-log-tail-tool.md) | 有界、脱敏且不授予行动权的 Run 日志尾部 Tool | Accepted | | [ADR-0403](./ADR-0403-bounded-redacted-run-log-tail-tool.md) | 有界、脱敏且不授予行动权的 Run 日志尾部 Tool | Accepted |
| [ADR-0404](./ADR-0404-optional-local-mcp-run-log-excerpt-surface.md) | 可选本机 MCP Run 日志摘录产品入口与私有文件边界 | Accepted | | [ADR-0404](./ADR-0404-optional-local-mcp-run-log-excerpt-surface.md) | 可选本机 MCP Run 日志摘录产品入口与私有文件边界 | Accepted |
| [ADR-0405](./ADR-0405-bounded-failure-diagnosis-prompt-and-model-egress-policy.md) | 有界故障诊断 Prompt 与显式模型出口策略 | Accepted |
| [ADR-0406](./ADR-0406-cluster-projected-tool-result-key-authority.md) | Cluster Projected Tool Result Key Authority | Accepted |
## 规则 ## 规则
@@ -120,6 +120,11 @@
"require": "./dist/remote-execution/mountedSecretProvider.js", "require": "./dist/remote-execution/mountedSecretProvider.js",
"default": "./dist/remote-execution/mountedSecretProvider.js" "default": "./dist/remote-execution/mountedSecretProvider.js"
}, },
"./trusted-tool-result-keyring": {
"types": "./dist/trusted-tool/key-management/toolResultProjectedKeyring.d.ts",
"require": "./dist/trusted-tool/key-management/toolResultProjectedKeyring.js",
"default": "./dist/trusted-tool/key-management/toolResultProjectedKeyring.js"
},
"./remote-completion": { "./remote-completion": {
"types": "./dist/remote-execution/remoteWorkerCompletionService.d.ts", "types": "./dist/remote-execution/remoteWorkerCompletionService.d.ts",
"require": "./dist/remote-execution/remoteWorkerCompletionService.js", "require": "./dist/remote-execution/remoteWorkerCompletionService.js",
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
// Remote Execution owns mounted Secret resolution for authenticated delivery. // Remote Execution owns mounted Secret resolution for authenticated delivery.
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { lstat, open, realpath } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { isAbsolute, join, normalize, parse, relative } from 'node:path';
import { import {
MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_DELIVERY_TOTAL_VALUE_BYTES, MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_DELIVERY_TOTAL_VALUE_BYTES,
MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES, MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES,
@@ -12,7 +9,7 @@ import {
} from '@qinglong/runtime-core/remote-secret-delivery'; } from '@qinglong/runtime-core/remote-secret-delivery';
import { secretProjectionFileName } from '@qinglong/runtime-core/secret-projection'; import { secretProjectionFileName } from '@qinglong/runtime-core/secret-projection';
const MAX_SECRET_ROOT_BYTES = 4096; import { PrivateProjectedFileReader } from '../security/privateProjectedFile';
export interface ClusterMountedSecretProviderOptions { export interface ClusterMountedSecretProviderOptions {
/** /**
@@ -38,20 +35,6 @@ export class ClusterMountedSecretProviderError extends Error {
} }
} }
function rootDirectory(value: string): string {
if (
typeof value !== 'string' ||
!isAbsolute(value) ||
parse(value).root === value ||
normalize(value) !== value ||
value.includes('\0') ||
Buffer.byteLength(value, 'utf8') > MAX_SECRET_ROOT_BYTES
) {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('invalid_configuration');
}
return value;
}
/** /**
* Kubernetes Secret keys cannot contain a SecretRef directly. This stable, * Kubernetes Secret keys cannot contain a SecretRef directly. This stable,
* non-reversible name also prevents Project/name input from becoming a path. * non-reversible name also prevents Project/name input from becoming a path.
@@ -66,72 +49,6 @@ export function clusterMountedSecretFileName(secretRef: string): string {
} }
} }
function remainsBelow(root: string, candidate: string): boolean {
const suffix = relative(root, candidate);
return (
suffix.length > 0 &&
!isAbsolute(suffix) &&
suffix !== '..' &&
!suffix.startsWith(`..${process.platform === 'win32' ? '\\' : '/'}`)
);
}
async function resolvedRoot(path: string): Promise<string> {
try {
const configured = await lstat(path);
if (!configured.isDirectory() || configured.isSymbolicLink()) {
throw new Error('root is not a direct directory');
}
return await realpath(path);
} catch (error) {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('root_unavailable', {
cause: error,
});
}
}
async function readMaterial(root: string, secretRef: string): Promise<Buffer> {
const candidate = join(root, clusterMountedSecretFileName(secretRef));
let handle;
try {
const target = await realpath(candidate);
if (!remainsBelow(root, target)) {
throw new Error('material escaped its root');
}
handle = await open(
target,
constants.O_RDONLY | (constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0),
);
const stat = await handle.stat();
if (
!stat.isFile() ||
stat.nlink !== 1 ||
stat.size < 0 ||
stat.size > MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES ||
(stat.mode & 0o111) !== 0 ||
(stat.mode & 0o027) !== 0
) {
throw new Error('material metadata is unsafe');
}
const bytes = await handle.readFile();
if (
bytes.byteLength !== stat.size ||
bytes.byteLength > MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES ||
(await realpath(candidate)) !== target
) {
bytes.fill(0);
throw new Error('material changed while reading');
}
return bytes;
} catch (error) {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('material_unavailable', {
cause: error,
});
} finally {
await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
function secretValue(bytes: Buffer): string { function secretValue(bytes: Buffer): string {
try { try {
const value = new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes); const value = new TextDecoder('utf-8', { fatal: true }).decode(bytes);
@@ -155,17 +72,34 @@ function secretValue(bytes: Buffer): string {
export class ClusterMountedSecretProvider export class ClusterMountedSecretProvider
implements RemoteWorkerSecretValueProvider implements RemoteWorkerSecretValueProvider
{ {
private readonly rootDirectory: string; private readonly reader: PrivateProjectedFileReader;
constructor(options: ClusterMountedSecretProviderOptions) { constructor(options: ClusterMountedSecretProviderOptions) {
if (!options || typeof options !== 'object' || Array.isArray(options)) { if (!options || typeof options !== 'object' || Array.isArray(options)) {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('invalid_configuration'); throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('invalid_configuration');
} }
this.rootDirectory = rootDirectory(options.rootDirectory); try {
this.reader = new PrivateProjectedFileReader({
rootDirectory: options.rootDirectory,
minimumBytes: 0,
maximumBytes: MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES,
access: 'private_material',
});
} catch (error) {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('invalid_configuration', {
cause: error,
});
}
} }
async verify(): Promise<void> { async verify(): Promise<void> {
await resolvedRoot(this.rootDirectory); try {
await this.reader.verify();
} catch (error) {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError('root_unavailable', {
cause: error,
});
}
} }
async resolve( async resolve(
@@ -179,13 +113,19 @@ export class ClusterMountedSecretProvider
cause: error, cause: error,
}); });
} }
const root = await resolvedRoot(this.rootDirectory);
const buffers: Buffer[] = []; const buffers: Buffer[] = [];
try { try {
const values = []; const values = [];
let totalBytes = 0; let totalBytes = 0;
for (const secretRef of normalized.secretRefs) { for (const secretRef of normalized.secretRefs) {
const bytes = await readMaterial(root, secretRef); const bytes = await this.reader
.read(clusterMountedSecretFileName(secretRef))
.catch((error) => {
throw new ClusterMountedSecretProviderError(
'material_unavailable',
{ cause: error },
);
});
buffers.push(bytes); buffers.push(bytes);
totalBytes += bytes.byteLength; totalBytes += bytes.byteLength;
if (totalBytes > MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_DELIVERY_TOTAL_VALUE_BYTES) { if (totalBytes > MAX_REMOTE_SECRET_DELIVERY_TOTAL_VALUE_BYTES) {
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer';
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { lstat, open, realpath } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { isAbsolute, join, normalize, parse, relative } from 'node:path';
const MAX_ROOT_DIRECTORY_BYTES = 4096;
const FILE_NAME_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,252}$/;
export interface PrivateProjectedFileReaderOptions {
readonly rootDirectory: string;
readonly minimumBytes: number;
readonly maximumBytes: number;
readonly access: 'private_material' | 'read_only_keyring';
}
export class PrivateProjectedFileError extends Error {
constructor(options?: ErrorOptions) {
super('Private projected file is unavailable', options);
this.name = 'PrivateProjectedFileError';
}
}
function unavailable(cause?: unknown): never {
throw new PrivateProjectedFileError({
cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause : undefined,
});
}
function rootDirectory(value: unknown): string {
if (
typeof value !== 'string' ||
!isAbsolute(value) ||
parse(value).root === value ||
normalize(value) !== value ||
value.includes('\0') ||
Buffer.byteLength(value, 'utf8') > MAX_ROOT_DIRECTORY_BYTES
) {
return unavailable();
}
return value;
}
function boundedInteger(value: unknown, minimum: number): number {
if (
typeof value !== 'number' ||
!Number.isSafeInteger(value) ||
value < minimum
) {
return unavailable();
}
return value;
}
function fileName(value: unknown): string {
if (typeof value !== 'string' || !FILE_NAME_PATTERN.test(value)) {
return unavailable();
}
return value;
}
function remainsBelow(root: string, candidate: string): boolean {
const suffix = relative(root, candidate);
return (
suffix.length > 0 &&
!isAbsolute(suffix) &&
suffix !== '..' &&
!suffix.startsWith(`..${process.platform === 'win32' ? '\\' : '/'}`)
);
}
function safeMode(
mode: number,
access: PrivateProjectedFileReaderOptions['access'],
): boolean {
if ((mode & 0o111) !== 0 || (mode & 0o007) !== 0) return false;
return access === 'private_material'
? (mode & 0o027) === 0
: (mode & 0o222) === 0 && (mode & 0o440) !== 0;
}
/** Internal, no-cache reader for Kubernetes atomic-writer style projections. */
export class PrivateProjectedFileReader {
readonly #rootDirectory: string;
readonly #minimumBytes: number;
readonly #maximumBytes: number;
readonly #access: PrivateProjectedFileReaderOptions['access'];
constructor(options: PrivateProjectedFileReaderOptions) {
if (!options || typeof options !== 'object' || Array.isArray(options)) {
unavailable();
}
const normalizedRoot = rootDirectory(options.rootDirectory);
const minimumBytes = boundedInteger(options.minimumBytes, 0);
const maximumBytes = boundedInteger(options.maximumBytes, 1);
if (
maximumBytes < minimumBytes ||
(options.access !== 'private_material' &&
options.access !== 'read_only_keyring')
) {
unavailable();
}
this.#rootDirectory = normalizedRoot;
this.#minimumBytes = minimumBytes;
this.#maximumBytes = maximumBytes;
this.#access = options.access;
}
async #resolvedRoot(): Promise<string> {
try {
const stat = await lstat(this.#rootDirectory);
if (!stat.isDirectory() || stat.isSymbolicLink()) return unavailable();
return await realpath(this.#rootDirectory);
} catch (cause) {
return unavailable(cause);
}
}
async verify(): Promise<void> {
await this.#resolvedRoot();
}
async read(name: string): Promise<Buffer> {
const normalizedName = fileName(name);
let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof open>> | undefined;
let bytes: Buffer | undefined;
try {
const root = await this.#resolvedRoot();
const candidate = join(root, normalizedName);
const target = await realpath(candidate);
if (!remainsBelow(root, target)) return unavailable();
handle = await open(
target,
constants.O_RDONLY | (constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0),
);
const before = await handle.stat();
if (
!before.isFile() ||
before.nlink !== 1 ||
before.size < this.#minimumBytes ||
before.size > this.#maximumBytes ||
!safeMode(before.mode, this.#access)
) {
return unavailable();
}
bytes = await handle.readFile();
const after = await handle.stat();
if (
bytes.byteLength !== before.size ||
after.dev !== before.dev ||
after.ino !== before.ino ||
after.size !== before.size ||
after.mtimeMs !== before.mtimeMs ||
(await realpath(candidate)) !== target ||
(await realpath(this.#rootDirectory)) !== root
) {
return unavailable();
}
const owned = bytes;
bytes = undefined;
return owned;
} catch (cause) {
return unavailable(cause);
} finally {
bytes?.fill(0);
await handle?.close().catch(() => undefined);
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer';
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { toolResultKeyMaterialProof } from '@qinglong/runtime-core/tool-result-key-catalog';
export const CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA =
'qinglong/cluster-tool-result-projected-keyring@v1' as const;
export const MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_BYTES = 64 * 1024;
export const MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_PROJECTED_KEYS = 16;
const KEY_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,127}$/;
const BASE64URL_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
const PROJECTION_DIGEST_DOMAIN = Buffer.from(
'qinglong/cluster-tool-result-projected-keyring-digest@v1\0',
'utf8',
);
export interface ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest {
readonly schema: typeof CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA;
readonly keys: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
}
export interface ClusterToolResultKeyringSummary {
readonly schemaVersion: 1;
readonly keyIds: readonly string[];
readonly materialProofs: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
readonly projectionDigest: string;
}
export class InvalidClusterToolResultKeyringManifestError extends TypeError {
readonly code = 'QL3_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_INVALID';
constructor() {
super('Cluster Tool result keyring manifest is invalid');
this.name = 'InvalidClusterToolResultKeyringManifestError';
}
}
function invalid(): never {
throw new InvalidClusterToolResultKeyringManifestError();
}
function exactKeys(value: object, expected: readonly string[]): boolean {
const actual = Object.keys(value).sort();
const canonical = [...expected].sort();
return (
actual.length === canonical.length &&
actual.every((key, index) => key === canonical[index])
);
}
function dataRecord(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
if (
!value ||
typeof value !== 'object' ||
Array.isArray(value) ||
Object.getPrototypeOf(value) !== Object.prototype
) {
return invalid();
}
return value as Record<string, unknown>;
}
function normalizedEntries(
value: unknown,
): readonly (readonly [string, string])[] {
const keys = dataRecord(value);
const entries = Object.entries(keys).sort(([left], [right]) =>
left < right ? -1 : left > right ? 1 : 0,
);
if (
entries.length < 1 ||
entries.length > MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_PROJECTED_KEYS
) {
return invalid();
}
const normalized: (readonly [string, string])[] = [];
for (const [keyId, encoded] of entries) {
let material: Buffer | undefined;
try {
if (
!KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(keyId) ||
typeof encoded !== 'string' ||
!BASE64URL_PATTERN.test(encoded)
) {
return invalid();
}
material = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64url');
if (
material.byteLength !== 32 ||
material.toString('base64url') !== encoded
) {
return invalid();
}
normalized.push(Object.freeze([keyId, encoded] as const));
} finally {
material?.fill(0);
}
}
return Object.freeze(normalized);
}
export function normalizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
value: unknown,
): Readonly<ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest> {
const manifest = dataRecord(value);
if (
!exactKeys(manifest, ['keys', 'schema']) ||
manifest.schema !== CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA
) {
return invalid();
}
return Object.freeze({
schema: CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA,
keys: Object.freeze(Object.fromEntries(normalizedEntries(manifest.keys))),
});
}
export function parseClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
bytes: Buffer,
): Readonly<ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest> {
try {
if (
!Buffer.isBuffer(bytes) ||
bytes.byteLength < 1 ||
bytes.byteLength > MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_BYTES
) {
return invalid();
}
return normalizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
JSON.parse(bytes.toString('utf8')),
);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof InvalidClusterToolResultKeyringManifestError) {
throw error;
}
return invalid();
}
}
export function canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
value: ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
): Buffer {
const manifest = normalizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(value);
return Buffer.from(`${JSON.stringify(manifest)}\n`, 'utf8');
}
export function resolveClusterToolResultKeyringMaterial(
value: ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
keyId: string,
): Readonly<{ keyId: string; key: Uint8Array }> | null {
if (typeof keyId !== 'string' || !KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(keyId))
return invalid();
const manifest = normalizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(value);
const encoded = manifest.keys[keyId];
if (encoded === undefined) return null;
const key = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64url');
if (key.byteLength !== 32 || key.toString('base64url') !== encoded) {
key.fill(0);
return invalid();
}
return Object.freeze({ keyId, key });
}
export function summarizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
value: ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
): Readonly<ClusterToolResultKeyringSummary> {
const manifest = normalizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(value);
const keyIds = Object.keys(manifest.keys).sort();
const materialProofs: Record<string, string> = Object.create(null);
for (const keyId of keyIds) {
const material = resolveClusterToolResultKeyringMaterial(manifest, keyId)!;
try {
materialProofs[keyId] = toolResultKeyMaterialProof(keyId, material.key);
} finally {
material.key.fill(0);
}
}
const canonicalProofs = Object.freeze({ ...materialProofs });
return Object.freeze({
schemaVersion: 1 as const,
keyIds: Object.freeze(keyIds),
materialProofs: canonicalProofs,
projectionDigest: createHash('sha256')
.update(PROJECTION_DIGEST_DOMAIN)
.update(
JSON.stringify({
schema: manifest.schema,
materialProofs: canonicalProofs,
}),
)
.digest('hex'),
});
}
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer';
import type { ToolInvocationArtifactKeyProvider } from '@qinglong/runtime-core/tool-invocation-artifact';
import { PrivateProjectedFileReader } from '../../security/privateProjectedFile';
import {
MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_BYTES,
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
parseClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
resolveClusterToolResultKeyringMaterial,
summarizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
type ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
type ClusterToolResultKeyringSummary,
} from './toolResultKeyringManifest';
const DATA_FILE_NAME = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,252}$/;
export {
CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA,
MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_BYTES,
MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_PROJECTED_KEYS,
InvalidClusterToolResultKeyringManifestError,
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
normalizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
parseClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
resolveClusterToolResultKeyringMaterial,
summarizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
type ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
type ClusterToolResultKeyringSummary,
} from './toolResultKeyringManifest';
export interface ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringOptions {
readonly rootDirectory: string;
readonly dataFileName?: string;
}
export class ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError extends Error {
readonly code = 'QL3_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_PROJECTED_KEYRING_UNAVAILABLE';
constructor(options?: ErrorOptions) {
super('Projected Cluster Tool result keyring is unavailable', options);
this.name = 'ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError';
}
}
function unavailable(
cause?: unknown,
): ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError {
return new ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError({
cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause : undefined,
});
}
function dataFileName(value: unknown): string {
if (typeof value !== 'string' || !DATA_FILE_NAME.test(value)) {
throw unavailable();
}
return value;
}
async function readManifest(
reader: PrivateProjectedFileReader,
fileName: string,
): Promise<Readonly<ClusterToolResultKeyringManifest>> {
let bytes: Buffer | undefined;
let canonical: Buffer | undefined;
try {
bytes = await reader.read(fileName);
const manifest = parseClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(bytes);
canonical = canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(manifest);
if (!canonical.equals(bytes)) throw unavailable();
return manifest;
} catch (cause) {
throw cause instanceof ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError
? cause
: unavailable(cause);
} finally {
bytes?.fill(0);
canonical?.fill(0);
}
}
/**
* Read-only result-key material authority for Kubernetes/CSI projections.
* PostgreSQL remains the sole active/decryptable state authority: this class
* only resolves key material and deliberately has no active() method.
*/
export class ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring
implements Pick<ToolInvocationArtifactKeyProvider, 'resolve'>
{
readonly #reader: PrivateProjectedFileReader;
readonly #dataFileName: string;
constructor(options: ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringOptions) {
if (!options || typeof options !== 'object' || Array.isArray(options)) {
throw unavailable();
}
try {
this.#reader = new PrivateProjectedFileReader({
rootDirectory: options.rootDirectory,
minimumBytes: 1,
maximumBytes: MAX_CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_BYTES,
access: 'read_only_keyring',
});
this.#dataFileName = dataFileName(options.dataFileName ?? 'keyring.json');
} catch (cause) {
throw unavailable(cause);
}
}
async verify(): Promise<Readonly<ClusterToolResultKeyringSummary>> {
return summarizeClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
await readManifest(this.#reader, this.#dataFileName),
);
}
async resolve(
keyId: string,
): ReturnType<Pick<ToolInvocationArtifactKeyProvider, 'resolve'>['resolve']> {
try {
return resolveClusterToolResultKeyringMaterial(
await readManifest(this.#reader, this.#dataFileName),
keyId,
);
} catch (cause) {
throw cause instanceof ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError
? cause
: unavailable(cause);
}
}
}
export async function createClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring(
options: ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringOptions,
): Promise<Readonly<ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring>> {
const provider = new ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring(options);
await provider.verify();
return provider;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
const assert = require('node:assert/strict');
const fs = require('node:fs/promises');
const os = require('node:os');
const path = require('node:path');
const { afterEach, test } = require('node:test');
const {
CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA,
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring,
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest,
createClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring,
} = require('../dist/trusted-tool/key-management/toolResultProjectedKeyring.js');
const {
toolResultKeyMaterialProof,
} = require('@qinglong/runtime-core/tool-result-key-catalog');
const roots = [];
afterEach(async () => {
await Promise.all(
roots
.splice(0)
.map((root) => fs.rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true })),
);
});
function manifest(keys) {
return Object.freeze({
schema: CLUSTER_TOOL_RESULT_KEYRING_MANIFEST_SCHEMA,
keys: Object.freeze(keys),
});
}
async function tempRoot() {
const root = await fs.mkdtemp(
path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'ql3-tool-result-keyring-'),
);
roots.push(root);
return root;
}
async function publish(root, generationName, bytes, mode = 0o440) {
const generation = path.join(root, generationName);
await fs.mkdir(generation, { mode: 0o750 });
const target = path.join(generation, 'keyring.json');
await fs.writeFile(target, bytes, { mode });
await fs.chmod(target, mode);
const next = path.join(root, '..data-next');
await fs.symlink(generationName, next);
await fs.rename(next, path.join(root, '..data'));
try {
await fs.symlink('..data/keyring.json', path.join(root, 'keyring.json'));
} catch (error) {
if (error.code !== 'EEXIST') throw error;
}
}
test('projected Tool result keyring follows atomic rotation without choosing the active catalog key', async () => {
const root = await tempRoot();
const keyOneBytes = Buffer.alloc(32, 0x11);
const keyTwoBytes = Buffer.alloc(32, 0x22);
const keyOne = keyOneBytes.toString('base64url');
const keyTwo = keyTwoBytes.toString('base64url');
await publish(
root,
'..2026_08_14_01',
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
manifest({ 'result-key-one': keyOne }),
),
);
const provider = await createClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({
rootDirectory: root,
});
assert.equal('active' in provider, false);
const firstSummary = await provider.verify();
assert.deepEqual(firstSummary.keyIds, ['result-key-one']);
assert.equal(
firstSummary.materialProofs['result-key-one'],
toolResultKeyMaterialProof('result-key-one', keyOneBytes),
);
const first = await provider.resolve('result-key-one');
assert.ok(first);
assert.deepEqual(Buffer.from(first.key), keyOneBytes);
first.key.fill(0);
await publish(
root,
'..2026_08_14_02',
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(
manifest({
'result-key-two': keyTwo,
'result-key-one': keyOne,
}),
),
);
const second = await provider.resolve('result-key-two');
assert.ok(second);
assert.deepEqual(Buffer.from(second.key), keyTwoBytes);
second.key.fill(0);
assert.equal(await provider.resolve('result-key-missing'), null);
});
test('projected Tool result keyring rejects noncanonical, writable and escaped material', async () => {
const encoded = Buffer.alloc(32, 0x33).toString('base64url');
const value = manifest({ 'result-key-one': encoded });
const noncanonicalRoot = await tempRoot();
await publish(
noncanonicalRoot,
'..2026_08_14_01',
Buffer.from(`${JSON.stringify(value, null, 2)}\n`, 'utf8'),
);
await assert.rejects(
() =>
createClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({
rootDirectory: noncanonicalRoot,
}),
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
);
const writableRoot = await tempRoot();
await publish(
writableRoot,
'..2026_08_14_01',
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(value),
0o640,
);
await assert.rejects(
() =>
new ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({
rootDirectory: writableRoot,
}).verify(),
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
);
const escapedRoot = await tempRoot();
const externalRoot = await tempRoot();
const external = path.join(externalRoot, 'keyring.json');
await fs.writeFile(
external,
canonicalClusterToolResultKeyringManifest(value),
{ mode: 0o440 },
);
await fs.symlink(external, path.join(escapedRoot, 'keyring.json'));
await assert.rejects(
() =>
new ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({
rootDirectory: escapedRoot,
}).verify(),
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
);
});
test('projected Tool result keyring rejects invalid material and ambiguous paths', async () => {
const invalidRoot = await tempRoot();
await publish(
invalidRoot,
'..2026_08_14_01',
Buffer.from(
`${JSON.stringify(
manifest({ 'result-key-one': Buffer.alloc(31).toString('base64url') }),
)}\n`,
'utf8',
),
);
await assert.rejects(
() =>
createClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({ rootDirectory: invalidRoot }),
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
);
const root = await tempRoot();
const rootLink = `${root}-link`;
roots.push(rootLink);
await fs.symlink(root, rootLink);
await assert.rejects(
() =>
new ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({
rootDirectory: rootLink,
}).verify(),
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
);
assert.throws(
() =>
new ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyring({
rootDirectory: root,
dataFileName: '../keyring.json',
}),
ClusterToolResultProjectedKeyringUnavailableError,
);
});
+2 -2
View File
@@ -385,10 +385,10 @@ test('current QL3 workspace has exactly eighteen reviewed package boundaries', (
rootSourceFileRoles: clusterControl.rootSourceFileRoles, rootSourceFileRoles: clusterControl.rootSourceFileRoles,
}, },
{ {
sourceFiles: 51, sourceFiles: 54,
rootSourceFiles: 2, rootSourceFiles: 2,
rootSourceLines: 195, rootSourceLines: 195,
nestedSourceFiles: 49, nestedSourceFiles: 52,
rootSourceFileRoles: { rootSourceFileRoles: {
'aiCli.ts': 'binary_entry', 'aiCli.ts': 'binary_entry',
'cli.ts': 'binary_entry', 'cli.ts': 'binary_entry',