qinglong/back/shared/auth.ts
Flody.lee 59a357f76f fix(security): harden command injection, path traversal, auth surfaces
Audit of the backend attack surface and fixes for the web-reachable
CRITICAL/HIGH issues. Adds back/shared/security.ts with centralized
hardening helpers (shellEscape, assertSafeDependenceName,
SUBSCRIPTION_PATTERNS, safeCompare, isSafeSshConfigValue).

- Subscription fields (url/branch/whitelist/blacklist/extensions/proxy)
  are now shell-escaped before reaching spawn() and validated with strict
  Joi patterns at the API, closing OS command injection and the
  downstream shell eval/git-arg-injection paths.
- Dependency names are validated before interpolation into
  pnpm/pip/apk/apt commands (incl. the embedded Python source).
- SSH config generation rejects newline/metachar injection in host/proxy
  (prevents injected ProxyCommand execution).
- ConfigService.getFile resolves the real path before containment check,
  fixing data/scripts/../db traversal that leaked the SQLite DB.
- /configs/save containment check fixed (sibling-dir write bypass).
- Script/env uploads use path.basename, preventing arbitrary file write
  (crontab.list/env.sh overwrite -> RCE) via multer originalname.
- JWT secret is generated and persisted per-install instead of the public
  default 'whyour-secret'; production refuses to boot without one.
- Token comparison is now constant-time (safeCompare).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-22 11:22:15 +08:00

50 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { AuthInfo, TokenInfo } from '../data/system';
import { safeCompare } from './security';
/**
* Validates if a token exists in the authentication info.
* Supports both legacy string tokens and new TokenInfo array format.
*
* @param authInfo - The authentication information
* @param headerToken - The token to validate
* @param platform - The platform (desktop, mobile)
* @returns true if the token is valid, false otherwise
*/
export function isValidToken(
authInfo: AuthInfo | null | undefined,
headerToken: string,
platform: string,
): boolean {
if (!authInfo || !headerToken) {
return false;
}
const { token = '', tokens = {} } = authInfo;
// Check legacy token field (constant-time)
if (token && safeCompare(headerToken, token)) {
return true;
}
// Check platform-specific tokens (support both legacy string and new TokenInfo[] format)
const platformTokens = tokens[platform];
// Handle null/undefined platformTokens
if (platformTokens === null || platformTokens === undefined) {
return false;
}
if (typeof platformTokens === 'string') {
// Legacy format: single string token
return safeCompare(headerToken, platformTokens);
} else if (Array.isArray(platformTokens)) {
// New format: array of TokenInfo objects (constant-time per entry)
return platformTokens.some(
(t: TokenInfo) => t && safeCompare(headerToken, t.value),
);
}
// Unexpected type - log warning and reject
return false;
}