mirror of
https://github.com/whyour/qinglong.git
synced 2026-06-28 02:45:08 +08:00
Audit of the backend attack surface and fixes for the web-reachable CRITICAL/HIGH issues. Adds back/shared/security.ts with centralized hardening helpers (shellEscape, assertSafeDependenceName, SUBSCRIPTION_PATTERNS, safeCompare, isSafeSshConfigValue). - Subscription fields (url/branch/whitelist/blacklist/extensions/proxy) are now shell-escaped before reaching spawn() and validated with strict Joi patterns at the API, closing OS command injection and the downstream shell eval/git-arg-injection paths. - Dependency names are validated before interpolation into pnpm/pip/apk/apt commands (incl. the embedded Python source). - SSH config generation rejects newline/metachar injection in host/proxy (prevents injected ProxyCommand execution). - ConfigService.getFile resolves the real path before containment check, fixing data/scripts/../db traversal that leaked the SQLite DB. - /configs/save containment check fixed (sibling-dir write bypass). - Script/env uploads use path.basename, preventing arbitrary file write (crontab.list/env.sh overwrite -> RCE) via multer originalname. - JWT secret is generated and persisted per-install instead of the public default 'whyour-secret'; production refuses to boot without one. - Token comparison is now constant-time (safeCompare). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
50 lines
1.5 KiB
TypeScript
import { AuthInfo, TokenInfo } from '../data/system';
|
|
import { safeCompare } from './security';
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validates if a token exists in the authentication info.
|
|
* Supports both legacy string tokens and new TokenInfo array format.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param authInfo - The authentication information
|
|
* @param headerToken - The token to validate
|
|
* @param platform - The platform (desktop, mobile)
|
|
* @returns true if the token is valid, false otherwise
|
|
*/
|
|
export function isValidToken(
|
|
authInfo: AuthInfo | null | undefined,
|
|
headerToken: string,
|
|
platform: string,
|
|
): boolean {
|
|
if (!authInfo || !headerToken) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const { token = '', tokens = {} } = authInfo;
|
|
|
|
// Check legacy token field (constant-time)
|
|
if (token && safeCompare(headerToken, token)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check platform-specific tokens (support both legacy string and new TokenInfo[] format)
|
|
const platformTokens = tokens[platform];
|
|
|
|
// Handle null/undefined platformTokens
|
|
if (platformTokens === null || platformTokens === undefined) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (typeof platformTokens === 'string') {
|
|
// Legacy format: single string token
|
|
return safeCompare(headerToken, platformTokens);
|
|
} else if (Array.isArray(platformTokens)) {
|
|
// New format: array of TokenInfo objects (constant-time per entry)
|
|
return platformTokens.some(
|
|
(t: TokenInfo) => t && safeCompare(headerToken, t.value),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Unexpected type - log warning and reject
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|