mirror of
https://github.com/whyour/qinglong.git
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Audit of the backend attack surface and fixes for the web-reachable CRITICAL/HIGH issues. Adds back/shared/security.ts with centralized hardening helpers (shellEscape, assertSafeDependenceName, SUBSCRIPTION_PATTERNS, safeCompare, isSafeSshConfigValue). - Subscription fields (url/branch/whitelist/blacklist/extensions/proxy) are now shell-escaped before reaching spawn() and validated with strict Joi patterns at the API, closing OS command injection and the downstream shell eval/git-arg-injection paths. - Dependency names are validated before interpolation into pnpm/pip/apk/apt commands (incl. the embedded Python source). - SSH config generation rejects newline/metachar injection in host/proxy (prevents injected ProxyCommand execution). - ConfigService.getFile resolves the real path before containment check, fixing data/scripts/../db traversal that leaked the SQLite DB. - /configs/save containment check fixed (sibling-dir write bypass). - Script/env uploads use path.basename, preventing arbitrary file write (crontab.list/env.sh overwrite -> RCE) via multer originalname. - JWT secret is generated and persisted per-install instead of the public default 'whyour-secret'; production refuses to boot without one. - Token comparison is now constant-time (safeCompare). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
111 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
111 lines
3.3 KiB
TypeScript
import { Router, Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
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import { Container } from 'typedi';
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import { Logger } from 'winston';
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import config from '../config';
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import * as fs from 'fs/promises';
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import { celebrate, Joi } from 'celebrate';
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import path, { basename } from 'path';
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import { SAMPLE_FILES } from '../config/const';
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import { t } from '../shared/i18n';
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import ConfigService from '../services/config';
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import { writeFileWithLock } from '../shared/utils';
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const route = Router();
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export default (app: Router) => {
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app.use('/configs', route);
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route.get(
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'/samples',
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async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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try {
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res.send({
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code: 200,
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data: SAMPLE_FILES,
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});
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} catch (e) {
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return next(e);
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}
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},
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);
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route.get(
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'/files',
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async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');
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try {
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const fileList = await fs.readdir(config.configPath, 'utf-8');
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res.send({
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code: 200,
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data: fileList
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.filter((x) => !config.blackFileList.includes(x))
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.map((x) => {
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return { title: x, value: x };
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}),
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});
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} catch (e) {
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return next(e);
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}
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},
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);
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route.get(
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'/detail',
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async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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try {
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const configService = Container.get(ConfigService);
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await configService.getFile(req.query.path as string, res);
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} catch (e) {
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return next(e);
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}
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},
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);
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route.post(
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'/save',
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celebrate({
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body: Joi.object({
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name: Joi.string().required(),
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content: Joi.string().allow('').optional(),
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}),
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}),
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async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');
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try {
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const { name, content } = req.body;
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// Resolve the final path first, then verify containment with a path
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// separator so sibling dirs (e.g. data/scripts-evil) cannot be reached.
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const isScripts = name.startsWith('data/scripts/');
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const basePath = path.resolve(
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isScripts ? config.scriptPath : config.configPath,
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);
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const cleanName = name.replace(/^data\/scripts\//, '');
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const normalized = path.resolve(basePath, cleanName);
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// Verify the resolved path stays within the allowed directory
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if (normalized !== basePath && !normalized.startsWith(basePath + path.sep)) {
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return res.send({ code: 403, message: t('文件路径无效') });
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}
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// Check blacklist on actual filename (not user input)
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if (config.blackFileList.includes(basename(normalized))) {
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return res.send({ code: 403, message: t('文件无法访问') });
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}
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await writeFileWithLock(normalized, content);
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res.send({ code: 200, message: t('保存成功') });
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} catch (e) {
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return next(e);
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}
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},
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);
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route.get(
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'/:file',
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async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
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try {
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const configService = Container.get(ConfigService);
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await configService.getFile(req.params.file, res);
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} catch (e) {
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return next(e);
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}
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},
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);
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};
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